存在主义是一种人道主义

出版时间：1988-4  出版社：上海译文出版社  作者：(法)让-保罗·萨特  页数：102  字数：73000  译者：周煦良,汤永宽  
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内容概要

存在主义是现代西方哲学中的影响极大、流传极广、风行一时的哲学流派。其主要代表人物就是法国哲学家萨特，他的思想渗透于各种意识形态和生活方式之中。    本书由两篇文章构成：《存在主义是一种人道主义》和《今天的希望：与萨特的谈话》。前者发表于1946年，萨特此文的“目的是针对几种对存在主义的责难而为它进行辩护”。同时指出它与其他哲学流派的异同，澄清了各种无意的误解和恶意的歪曲。后篇发表于1980年萨特去世前不认，在其中，萨特一再强调，他的存在主义本质上是一种对人生充满希望的乐观主义哲学。

作者简介

让-保罗·萨特（Jean-Paul Sartre,1905-1980），法国当代著名哲学家、文学家、剧作家和社会活动家。法国存在主义的首倡者，被誉为“存在主义的鼻祖“。其主要作品有：《恶心》（1938）、《存在与虚无》（1943）、《苍蝇》（1943）、《存在主义是一种人道主义》（1946）等。

书籍目录

存在主义是一种人道主义今天的希望：与萨特的谈话

章节摘录

书摘今天的希望：与萨特的谈话    莱维：一段时间以来，您一直在思考希望和绝望问题。这是两个您过去在著作中没有更多地涉及的主题。    萨特：至少，不是以同样的方式。因为我始终认为每个人都爱希望，我的意思是说，每个人都认为无论他从事什么工作，或者无论什么只要与他，或者与他所属的社会团体利害有关的事，都是在取得实现的过程中，而且对他和对构成他那个社团的人们也必将是有利的。我认为希望是人的一部分；人类的行动是超越的，那就是说，它总是在现在中孕育，从现在朝向一个未来的目标，我们又在现在中设法实现它；人类的行动在未来找到它的结局，找到它的完成；在行动的方式中始终有希望在，我的意思是说，就确定一个目标加以实现这一点而言。    莱维：您曾经说过，人类的行动朝向一个未来的目标，但是您立刻接下去说这个行动是毫无结果的。希望必然是失望。在一个咖啡馆的侍者，一个人民领袖——希特勒或者斯大林——一个巴黎醉汉，战斗的革命的马克思主义者和让一保罗·萨特中间，在所有这些人中间，看来有一种共同的东西：假如他们都为自己确定一些目标，那末，可以说，他们都会失败。    萨特：我没有这样确切地说，你夸张了。我曾说他们决不会真正达到他们所寻求的目标，我曾说这里始终存在着一种失败……    莱维：您曾声称人类的行动把目的投射到未来中去，但是您也说过这种超越的运动最终引向失败。您在《存在与虚无》中描述了一种存在，尽管它怀着严肃认真的精神设想了种种目的，那些目的仍然像绝对的失败。人为自己提出目标，但是在内心深处，他惟一想望实现的目标是成为上帝，这就是您称之为由自我促成的。由此，自然就导致失败。    萨特：唔，我并没有完全失去这种失败的观念，即使它与希望的观念相矛盾。人们不应忘记在我写《存在与虚无》的时候，我不是在谈希望。关于希望的价值的观念，那是后来才慢慢地在我脑子里出现的。我从未把希望想象成异想天开的幻想。我始终在考虑，即使在我没有谈起这个问题的时候，这是设想我所确定的目的可以得到实现的一种方式。P33-34

用户评论 (总计95条)

•   貌似悲观的存在主义传达的真正意念在于给予我们从废墟中重新站起来的力量，正如萨特的存在主义在二战后的日本如此受欢迎，正如加缪西西弗斯的神话不断将巨石推向山顶。一种沉重，深邃但又富含人道主义的哲学思想之下，萨特为我们阐释了存在主义的真正内涵。存在主义是一种人道主义。
•   一直都挺喜欢萨特的存在主义哲学，但是对于存在主义的核心思想一直都没有清晰的轮廓，他的这篇文章本来是反驳其他评判存在主义的文章，但是对于我们进入存在主义哲学的人来说，是很好的入门文章
•   萨特的著作对知识分子的人生起到一定的指导作用。
•   个人很崇拜萨特，要认识萨特就请从这本书开始！
•   永远支持萨特！
•   已经看过N遍，这本书还是值得收藏滴！
•   书印的很好，翻译的也好，价钱又便宜，很不错
•   额外华国锋大部分
•   译得还可以
•   终于买到这本书了！！高兴之极！！！一夜未合眼，先睹为快了。读书人的心情，本来如此。
•   译文经典系列当然是好书，选题印刷都没得说。可惜，正文第6页第2行，“…上帝的观念被禁止了，但是尽管如此，本质先于存在的思想仍然没有出现；这种思想到处都碰得见…”。这句话肯定有错误！“出现”一词是个错误。在此句上文中，作者说明上帝是按本质创造存在，也即“本质先于存在”，何来“本质先于存在的思想仍然没有出现”？而存在主义者强调的是“存在先于本质”。上帝的观念既然被禁止了，那么“本质先于存在”的观念也应该得到相应的改变。因此，这句话要表达的意思应该是，上帝的观念虽然被禁止了，但是还没有触及本质先于存在的观念，也即本质先于存在的思想仍然没有改变。此处错误可能是校对出现的错误。希望下次印刷时能够改正。
•   书很薄 但印刷很精美 封面也很美，喜欢！！！！文章很精彩！对存在主义有了更多了解~
•   译者的序把萨特的一生写了一遍
•   萨特的思想 很多东西给人激励
•   是正版。不过书略薄，不大适合做精装...但是内容和纸质都不错，而且挺喜欢的，这就算没白买了呗
•   送姐姐的，她很喜欢~
•   就是喜欢萨特，看他的书会有很多共鸣，也给自己提供了很多新的思考方向。
•   再版的书变成硬面的，适合收藏
•   还没有看书，但是产品包装不错，看起来很舒服
•   这本小册子，编得很有意思
•   这本书是精装本，看过去很像是精美的硬皮笔记本，内容还没看，应该不错，比较薄，萨特大师的作品。
•   书的装帧，印刷都非常好。。萨特的作品第一次读
•   很古典包装的小册子，印刷很好。还没看，给个好评。
•   　　萨特出版《存在与虚无》之后，虽然以严谨的逻辑让人欣赏，但太过晦涩，以至于“法国的普通读者读起来也十分苦恼”。而正因晦涩的哲学，让人难以读懂，往往就伴随着断章取义的曲解。
  　　
  　　萨特一度十分苦恼，“存在主义被指责为鼓励人们对人生采取无所作为的绝望态度”。而另一方面的谴责来自于萨特的存在哲学并不承认有所谓的“普遍的人性”存在。
  　　
  　　好吧，接下来可以大致交代一下萨特的主要思想了。首先“存在先于本质”，这也就否定了神创造人的观点。“人就是人。这不仅说他是自己认为的那样，而且也是他愿意成为的那样。人除了自己认为的那样以外，什么都不是。”这样看来，人会成为什么样的人，完全都是自己选择的结果。人有选择的自由，而自由难免干涉他人。人总是在不断做出选择中生存，而人在做出选择的时候，就要承担做这个选择相应的责任。并想想如果人人都像你这样做，会对社会造成什么影响。人在选择的同时要承担责任，这是存在的痛苦，而人可以自由的选择，这是存在的乐观。
  　　
  　　存在主义旨在说明，人的本质是不断改变的，人具备不断完善自己的能力。而同时，一个人的所有处境都是自己的选择，你之所以成为一个懦夫或者一个英雄，并非命中注定，而是你主动选择的结果。每个人都能成为更好的人，除非他选择堕落或者自己选择不做选择。行动，才是存在的唯一动力。“人只是他企图成为的那样，那只是在实现自己意图上方才存在，所以他除掉自己的行动总和外，什么都不是。除掉他的生命外，什么都不是。”
  　　
  　　在你没有成为你最终要成为的那个人之前，你什么都可以改变。
•   　　这本很薄的小册子收录了两篇文章，一篇是《存在主义是一种人道主义》的演讲稿，另一篇是《对<局外人>的评论》。我猜想第二篇被收录进来多半是为了凑字，因为第一篇的篇幅太短。但有意味的是，这两篇文章恰恰形成了有趣的张力，让我们看到存在主义的不同面貌。萨特在第二篇文章中强调“存在”与语境相脱离，生活自身是无序的、断裂的、由自足的一小段一小段拼接起来的，这构成生活自身的荒诞。但这两篇文章的并置，它们的不同侧重乃至矛盾，恰恰提示我们存在主义内在于它所处的语境当中，是一种社会历史性非常强的哲学思想。
  　　尽管《存在主义是一种人道主义》对存在主义的一些关键概念——比如焦虑，被抛，存在先于本质，绝望等等——给予了深入浅出的解释，编者仍然在这本书的序言部分提示我们，《存在主义是一种人道主义》是萨特面对社会主义和天主教力量对他的攻击而所作出的回应，并且是以公众演讲的方式，因而其针对性和文体意味着这篇文章并不能代替《存在与虚无》而成为我们理解萨特思想的路径。这一提示的价值在我们读《对<局外人>的评论》时就变得明朗起来。《存在主义是一种人道主义》所强调的人和人之间的互助关系以及共同命运恰恰是《对<局外人>的评论》所潜在抵制的。在这篇更早的文章当中，萨特认为由于没有某种先在的行为规范和道德准则，一切自由选择——自主决定并预见到该决定后果——基础上的处世方式及思想观念都是被允许的，因此这必然导致个体和个体之间的陌生感和沟通的有限性——“有一天你将发现你爱的那个人成为了陌生人”。萨特认为人的高贵就在于意识到这种生之荒诞和无意义的必然性，并且有勇气去直面这一事实，而不是和大多数人一起参与伪造某种道德标准和社会习俗，牺牲自觉的行为偏好、感觉和冲动去顺从它，仅仅因为它是面目不清的群众创造并维持的假象。众人同情或愤恨在这里，萨特显然预设了“大多数人”是虚伪的，正是这种普遍的虚伪才成就了作为“局外人”的默而索的清醒以及他反抗绝望的悲剧精神。但在《存在主义是一种人道主义》当中，萨特却强调人和人之间的共同命运以及某种实用主义精神——必须面对被抛的命运，并且根据现有的资源进行切合实际的自由选择。他的“人道主义”就是个体必须以他之外的某种目标为指向，并且将自身作为他所存在的宇宙的能动主体。
  　　不管这是他的原初想法还是他的权宜之计，通过强调绝望处境的必然性和自由选择来争取共产主义和天主教力量的同情和支持显然是徒劳了。由于后两者对身份政治的强调，自我牺牲而非自由选择乃是它们的行为准则。即便如此，无论共产主义还是天主教都无法忽视萨特，因为他是战后人们的心态以及生存状态的最好阐释，没有人可以逃脱。这也就是为什么萨特、加缪、海明威以及50-60年代西方社会运动者以及80年代的中国青年能够形成某种呼应和联系的根本原因。
  　　《对<局外人>的评论》另一个有趣之处是它的文本细读。萨特用了一种绝对不亚于新批评和结构主义的极其详尽乃至于过度阐释的方法分析了《局外人》用词和局势。语言学转向影响下的批评方法按照科学主义的思路寻找语言的某种既定规律，而强调生活之荒诞的萨特作为那个时代的人，难免也借助甚至倾心于科学主义；正如加缪用一种极其严谨的文本组织方法来建构起某种荒谬和散漫的情节表象。这多少让我们想起19世纪的拉斐尔前派——他们在缅怀中世纪以及英国民间文学的同时，对19世纪的自然主义以及科学技术采取积极投入的态度。萨特对线性时间和叙事性的反对赋予存在主义某种对时代、语境以及历史的离心力，剩下的是自由的个体坐在一片上不着天下不着地的虚无和废墟之中。但是无论是这种虚无情绪本身还是萨特（以及加缪）流露出的科学主义倾向，都使存在主义比其他诸多哲学思想更深地扎根于它藉以萌生的时代和社会。
  　　存在主义强调“向死而生”，要求个体明白自己被抛到虚无之中，必须自己赋予自己确定性；存在主义的实际处境恰恰相反——它诞生并存在于及其特殊的战后社会语境当中，却努力要将自己导向无关于时间和连续性的虚无境地，并在此基础上提供某种有关个体存在的普适性规律。
•   　　（P16）我要估量这种感情的深浅，只有付诸行为，以行动来说明和肯定我的感情的深浅。
  　　
  　　（P16）情感是由人的行为形成的。
  　　
  　　（P17）在你选择一个人向他请教时，你作这项选择就已经承担责任了。
  　　
  　　（P19）因为人是自由的，而且没有什么人性可以认为是基本的。
  　　
  　　（P20）事情是由人们决定要怎样就怎样的。
  　　
  　　（P22）因为使人成为懦夫的是放弃或者让步的行为；而气质并不是一种行动。
  　　
  　　（P25）对所谓人的处境，他们的理解是相当清楚的，即一切早先就规定了人在宇宙中基本处境的限制。
  　　（中略）
  　　如果人不联系这些限制而自由地决定自己和自己的存在，这些限制就是微不足道的。
  　　
  　　（P26）任何意图都具有普遍性；在这个意义上，任何意图都是任何人所理解得了的。
  　　
  　　（P35）一个存在主义者永远不会把人当作目的，因为人仍旧在形成中。
•   　　萨特对于周遭环境事物是那么敏感，他的“注视”体现在意识的牢牢锁定，而已不局限于双眼。意识催生出强大的念力，这是萨特一贯强调的积极性哲学。
  　　
  　　“行动吧，在行动的过程中就形成了自身，人是自己行动的结果，此外什么都不是。”不要让遗憾、悲怆在第一时间左右我们的主动思考、积极行动、向往自由的权利。
•   　　 活在这个世代的我的还在形成中的世界观里有这么一个概念：没有绝对的对，没有绝对的错，每一种说法和每一个概念都代表一种角度在特定的场合下都是解释的通的。至少我深以为然。
  　　 萨特的那本巨作我还没看，只是看了这一篇简短的辩护文，就产生了一些想法，想要做个笔记，这笔记只是有个人色彩的拙见而已。
  　　
  　　[12页-22页]
  　　1.“存在主义被指责为鼓励人们对人生采取无所作为的绝望态度”
  　　 我想起那句“命里有时终须有，命里无时莫强求”。一听就是宿命论的调调。宿命论在很多人眼中是很消极的，让人不愉快的。当年我娘常把这句话挂在嘴边，就被同事指责消极了，多年后，经历了很多事后，那同事也开始同意这句话来了。人生的关键就是要学会放弃啊。
  　　
  　　2.“观望是一种奢侈品”
  　　 置身事外，笑傲江湖，这是多少人的追求呢？这是温饱解决后的事情吧？你看，我又俗了。置身俗世就是不可能抱观望态度啊。总有一件事情会让人愤怒的，总有一件事情会让人同情的，虽然是别人的事情，但总有一些事情会触动到自己的神经的。做到不问世事的，估计不是凡人了吧。
  　　
  　　3.“存在主义被责难为强调了人类处境的阴暗一面”
  　　 新闻里那些让人不爽的案件特别让人印象深刻；刚接触占星时，我对那些硬相位特别感兴趣，总觉得理解了那些最不堪的境况，接受了最坏的可能性，就没有比这更惨的遭遇了。人类处境的阴暗面也好，人类内在的阴暗面也好，有光明就有阴影，承认月球有站在这里看不到的那一头背面，就是悲观主义么？
  　　
  　　4.“人是无法同存在于自我之外的他人取得一致的”
  　　 一个人是一座岛----水木丁姐的博客标题----当时偶然瞥见就非常合我心意啊。后来对萨特的初次印象是他的那句“他人即地狱”。想要与他人取得一致，这个目标太遥远了嘛，要求太高了嘛。一家人都有参差不齐的，更何况不同环境长大的他人？正因为无法取得一致，所以我们偶尔碰见意见差不多，兴趣爱好差不多的人，就特别高兴，特别的有志同道合甚至灵魂伴侣的感觉。
  　　
  　　5.“谁喜欢怎样做就可以怎样做，我们将无法申斥任何人的观点或者行动”
  　　 这句说得好像法律道德正义等无法束缚一个人一样。最近也在看卢梭的《社会契约论》，在谈生死权时，有一点大概是说，我们都没有处死别人的权利，而法律上有刑罚，是因为我们每个人在立法之前就因为大家都不想成为凶手的牺牲品，而一致同意假如自己成为了凶手也得死。最初的目的就是为了保障自己的生命，没有人在当初就预想自己被处死的。而凶手是侵犯了他人，攻击了社会权利，破坏了国家法律，所以保全国家和保全凶手不能相容。
  　　 不过，在不重大影响他人的情况下，这句话是成立的吧。那么自杀呢？自杀者的身体已经毁灭了，死亡这件事情在他死后仍然不停折磨着跟他最亲近的人，等于他一直在伤害他们。那么不相干的陌生人呢？所以这句话是针对陌生人的么？我们无法对陌生人所作所为评价什么的意思？
  　　
  　　6.“存在主义是一种使人生成为可能的学说，它为人类打开了选择的可能性”
  　　 过去我比较相信宿命论，觉得遇到的事情都有我遇到它们的道理，如果一切都是应该出现的，那么困难和悲伤也是应该有的，我就不会那么想不通那么不开心了。后来出现了一些用这个理论讲不通的事情。如果把这个世界解释成，一切事物不是由必然性而是由偶然性组成的，这就把上面宿命论的一些bug给修复了。我的生存之道的一些bug也修复了。
  　　
  　　7.“裁纸刀的本质，先于它的存在”
  　　 这句是针对已存在的物体说的吧。工匠会想要达到某一固定目的而按照固定方式制造物件，所以技术角度看是本质在先，存在在后。那按这个思路想，对于已存在的bug，人们想要改善生活，所以发明一些什么去修复那个bug，也是来源于固定的未知目的的需要？
  　　 这么说来，知道自己缺什么，应该在缺的方面填补一些什么，这么清楚的目的，不会是完全的未知，不是完全的无中生有呢（无中生有，怎么能“无”中生“有”呢，早期发明都是本来就存在于自然界的物体来的，这么说，应该是存在先于本质咯？），所以连发明创造也是有根有据的。
  　　 最初原始社会的一些偶然发现是偶然性积累成规律的结果，现在要做的好像是不停的修复那些bug。或者有这样的想法，正是因为我脱离不出那个框框（本质）吧。
  　　
  　　8.“如果存在真是先于本质的话，人就要对自己是怎样的人负责”
  　　 这句话是用谁的角度来说的呢？如果啊，这里只有我跟你。你做了一件自找的事情，我劝过你了，你不听还是继续深陷其中，那么我应该不要多干涉啊。一件事情，我觉得不好的，你觉得没什么，那么我也不该多说什么，最终的任何后果都是你承担的。但是，无论怎样，即使是我决定不要多干涉你的事，还是我认为你要自己为自己负责，都其实免不了有种劝不了你，为了摆脱内疚感困扰而找托词的意思在里面。不过你做“错”事，我决定放弃劝说你，其实也就决定了要承担这种内疚感缠身的感觉了。所以，所有行为的后果，不管愿意不愿意，真的是自负的。
  　　
  　　9.“……所有领袖都懂得这种痛苦。它阻止不了他们采取行动；相反，它是他们行动的真正条件，因为这个行动先就假定有多种可能性，而选择其中之一时，他们懂得其价值只是由于被挑选上了”
  　　 总觉得，即使预知了无法逃脱的坏结局仍然改变不了奔向那个结局的命运的，这是不是消极就不知道了，没有一点外力是很难脱轨的呢。
  　　 这篇小短文本身只是12页-42页共三十页那么长，后面的再有什么想法也不记录了，或者是我虎头蛇尾了，或者是觉得这些想法没有建设性不想再多纠缠了，又或者是家里太吵了，等下次一时打鸡血再记录吧。
  　　 12宫蠢蠢欲动的这几年，估计能期待有很多的成长吧，真好>v<。
  　　
  　　
  　　==============存在主义的核心思想==============
  　　[34页]
  　　自由承担责任的绝对性质；通过自由承担责任，任何人在体现一种人类类型时，也体现了自己——这样的承担责任，无论对什么人，也不管在任何时代，始终是可理解的——以及因这种绝对承担责任而产生的对文化模式的相对性影响。
  　　============================================
•   　　 在人存在之前神并不存在，因而不存在任何预设的目的，人的一切都应该有人来决定；人给自己下定义，人决定自己应该成为什么样的人。
  　　
  　　 人不能把他的意愿交给他人，因为人是自由的，他有自己的选择，他遵循自己的意志，我唯一能依靠的只有自己，事实上也是如此，我们不能把自己的意志和选择加给他人，也不能相信承载自己意志的人会绝对按照自己的意志行事。
  　　
  　　 除掉行动外，没有真实，人只是他企图成为的那样，除掉他自己的行动总和外，他什么都不是，一个人成为什么人是根据他做的事情决定的，人的生活就是行动，由他做的事我们可以判断他是什么人和他拥有什么生活。
  　　
  　　 存在主义不使人成为物，不使人成为实现目的的手段，而是人本身就是目的，这个目的没有止境，因为人一直在发展，唯物主义说物质决定意识，意识是对物质的反映，对同样的物质而言人类具有相同的反应，这就预设了人的行动，这可能么？再次重申一点，人是自由的，人不是手段。
  　　
  　　 我们从我思中发现了自己，也发现了别人，没有对照的我思并不能得出什么结论，这是参照物，发现自己的同时也发现了别人，别人是自己存在的条件。
  　　
  　　 人类可以理解他人一方面是因为人类生活在同样的限制下，比如劳动和死亡，这些限制使人类相互理解成为可能。存在主义的核心思想是自由承担责任的绝对性，人在承担责任是不仅反映了他自己，也反映了这一类人的类型，这种绝对承担责任对文化模式产生相对性的影响，责任是绝对的，但是根据限制的不同责任的具体内容有所不同，由此得到了不同的文化模式，但是由于共同限制的存在，使人类的相互理解成为了可能。
  　　
  　　 人类通过行动承担责任，而行动之前需要选择，选择是普遍性的，在某种意义上，选择是可能的，而不选择不是不可能的，即使不选择，也不过是我选择的不选择，这仍然是一种选择，只是在这种选择里我选择不选择，比如沉默不说话，或者静止不行动。生活是由人决定的，生活在没有人生活之前是没有，内容的，他的价值恰恰就是你选择的那种意义，而这些选择所导致的行为构成了生活本身，也就是说生活并不是预设的，在人存在之前没有生活。
  　　
  　　 存在的人道主义，是除了人之外，并无其他的立法者存在。另外，存在主义认为人必须在自身之外寻求一个解放自己或者体现某种理想的目标，人才能体现自己真正是人，也就是说人要给自己定目标，在行动中规定自己是什么人，并在行动中规定自己的本质，而这个目标是超越自己的。
•   　　萨特说存在主义是一种人道主义，基础观点是存在先于本质，具体到人，那便是人成为什么样的人是由其自身选择造成的。懦夫也好，强者也罢，这些并不是一开始就存在的，也就是说并非与生俱来的。换句话说，人具有极强的主观能动性，并且应该为自己的行为负责。人在选择的同时应该思索“如果人人都像我这样做，世界会变得怎么样”？即人在抉择的同时，为全社会树立了模板，该为全社会负责。在他的体系中，评判的标尺是自由——高层次的自由，犹如在司汤达《巴马修道院》里，拉•桑赛飞琳娜由于相信一个男子的真正价值就在于有热情，当众宣称崇高的感情是值得为之做出牺牲的。而且，正如司汤达所表现的，如果生活对她做出这种要求，她也会从感情的高度牺牲自己。这种自由，绝非为泄欲胡作非为的借口。
  　　与此相对的是叔本华对于人自身的定义。叔本华认为人的本质从一开始便已注定，它是不可更改的。后天的教育及其他外界因素的影响改变的只是人的思维方式。也就是说他本身的目标并未改变，只是所采取的手段方式被束缚，或是说被教导。就好比一个个利己主义者，在外界环境的影响下，他的思维方式可能发生改变，通过不同的抉择，塑造不同的形象，如懦弱——保全自身，息事宁人，卑劣——损人利己，不择手段，高尚——争取平等，只有如此自己的权利才能取得最大化并长期维持。总而言之，我觉得存在先于形象，而非本质。因为只有真情流露的霎那间才是他本质的体现，而这往往连他自己都未曾发觉。
  　　萨特说只要有足够的资料，我们总有办法去了解一个人。可问题的关键在于，我们如何去掌握足够多的资料？有时候，我们获得到的都是带有偏见的，有时候抉择本身就是违心之作。记得古人举过一个例子（具体是谁我忘了）：从山的一边越过鸿沟抵达另一边，勇者可能不需要借助外界刺激，想跳也就跳了；次勇者，激以十金；次次勇者，百金。金钱不足，后面追着老虎，他也就跳了过去。这个例子可能极端了一点，但可以说明抉择都是一样的，原因却很不同，我们所看到的并不是率性而发的“本质”。另外，萨特要求我们从心而为之，可多少人能有这样的气魄，大多数人可能更多的是妥协，就连强力意志的尼采，最终受不了孤寂而疯狂。例如最近一位在中国大受追捧的韩星，曾经是很man的，如今做出这样的改变，你说哪个是他真实想法？又或者都不是？而在中国，压抑就更为全方位了。我觉得人的本质是不能被认识的，我们所了解到的，只是粉饰过的形象罢了。
  　　纵使这样，我仍认同人要为自己的行为负责。就好比利己主义者，你追求利益最大化并没有错，但手段方法便受到法律的制约了。你既然做出了选择，就应该明白这之后的影响及所要承担的责任。情非得已的情况不是没有，但特殊不能代替一般，且成年人有且必须有自制力，有自律意识，也因此所采取的行为并非本质的体现。
  　　萨特的观点我并非全部认同，但人的形象确实是由于自我的不断抉择所塑造的，自身的不如意自己要负很大的责任。我不是鹰犬，只是我们不能只是抱怨，要生存，要发展，要解决问题。
  　　
•   　　这本书由两部分组成，两部分译者不同，第一部分是“针对几种对存在主义的责难进行辩护”，短短三十几页，对存在主义有了大概的了解；第二部分是萨特和莱维的对话，主要涉及萨特思想的演化，这一部分让我觉得艰涩难懂，读起来很吃力，读完不知所云。
  　　第一部分读完还是很有收获的：
  　　存在主义是一种容易理解、容易践行的实用主义哲学。
  　　它强调存在先于本质，“首先有人，人碰上自己，在世界上涌现出来——然后才给自己下定义”。
  　　存在主义强调人的主观性，意义通过选择和行动体现出来，“人只是在企图成为什么的时候才取得存在”。
  　　行动的重要性不言而喻，理论和信仰如果有什么现实意义，也不过是起一种大纲性质的指导作用，“这就是说，去发明吧。没有任何普遍的道德准则能指点你应当怎样做：世界上没有任何天降的标志……但是尽管有，不管是什么情形，总还得我自己去理解这些标志”。
  　　对于喜欢抱怨和推脱责任的人来说，存在主义就像是当头一棒，“一个人投入生活中，给自己画了像，除了这个画像外，什么都没有”。
  　　但是存在主义是乐观的，“是懦夫把自己变成懦夫，是英雄把自己变成英雄；而且这种可能性是永远存在的”。
•   　　 此文是萨特对存在主义所受的责难的做出的辩护，言辞犀利。
  　　
  　　 关于物的“本质先于存在”的阐述。
  　　
  　　 从基督教存在主义的观点阐述关于人的“本质先于存在”，但这显而易见是将“人”这一概念的普遍性推向了极端。于是引出无神论存在主义者眼中“人是存在先于本质的特殊存在”，进而提出存在主义的第一原则——人除了自己认为的那样以外，什么都不是。也就是说，人在通过自己的愿意定义创造自己前，什么也不是，不存在人这一概念，当然也不存在人性的善或恶。
  　　
  　　 “把自己存在的责任完全由自己担负起来”
  　　 在这里，萨特着重谈了这种负责并非是只对自己负责，也是对所有人负责——因为我们在为自己做选择是，只能选择更好的（这里的更好必须是对所有人都更好，否则就谈不上更好）。也因为迫于生存的压力，我们在铸造自己的形象时，必须使之符合整个时代的价值观——这样一来，就将个体的人与整体的人连接了起来，随之所要承担的责任便也宽泛了起来。而更大的责任，意味着痛苦，一种“亚伯拉罕式的痛苦”，一种“领袖式的痛苦”。
  　　
  　　 “听任”
  　　 存在主义者不赞成通过发明新的道德准则来使上帝不声不响地死掉。存在主义者会将“上帝是不存在的”这一命题一直推演到底。但这一推演却是尴尬而痛苦的。因为没有上帝的存在，也就意味着人的内心找不到依靠，在模铸自己的形象时，会找不到参照标准，这样一来就使我们所有人都处在一个没有价值照耀的黑暗世界里，孤苦伶仃，无法自解。这样的我们是自由的，彻底的自由，但却是被迫的自由，因为这不是我们所能选择的，这是我们被创造出来后便被赋予的自由，我们就是自由。
  　　 我们在没有任何指引，支持或帮助的情况下，却不得不随时对所有人负责，为所有人做出更好的选择。决定我们存在的是我们自己，这种听任带来莫大的痛苦。
  　　
  　　 “绝望”“严峻的乐观主义”
  　　 这是一种残酷的思想，但却真实。存在主义强调“存在”，所以任何事物在付诸行动将其实践之前，都是不存在的，包括梦，期待，爱。甚至于作为“人”，除掉一系列行为之后，便不复存在了。
  　　 存在主义者不相信热情，但深信是由人决定了自身的存在，决定了自己会成为怎样的一个存在，所以这其实是把决定权交到我们自己手中。一切又说回到“负责”。
  　　
  　　 如果你对面对一个感觉选择左右为难，千万别去找存在主义者讨教。他们会告诉你“首先，价值太抽象了，无法把握，不能用来决定我们所考虑的特殊的，具体的问题。其次，情感在真正付诸行动之前，是无法衡量其深浅的，所以我们也不能使用情感作为行动的参照。再次，你找上我，你多少就已经知道我会给你什么忠告了，你就已经为你的选择负责了。所以，你选择吧，你是自由的。”
  　　
  　　 存在主义最接近理性的天堂。不承认宗教，不承认基本的人性，在这种孤寂的情况下什么也不能依靠，没有参考标准，却不得不一直改变自己，创造未来。这是种巨大的责任。但是存在主义又比悲观主义更积极。
  　　
  　　 哲学的魅力就在于思辨，如果你停止思考与质疑，那哲学就变得和宗教无异。所以这样一篇类似于辩论的文章是很引人入胜的，因为它从至少两个不同角度来阐述了一个比较完整的理论体系。而关于“自由”“选择”“责任”的一再论述，恰到好处解答了我的些许疑惑。
  　　
  　　
•   　　买这本书，因为一眼看到了书名，正是我前段时间思考到的程度。
  　　目前看到第五页。
  　　虽说是力荐，但和力荐哈利波特的意思显然是不一样的。
  　　
  　　萨特开篇就说写这篇短文是针对几种对存在主义的责难对它进行辩护。
  　　
  　　我大言不惭的说，这几种责难正是各色人等针对我的几种责难。只是我的辩护，只是说给自己听。
  　　
  　　至于存在先于本质，目前我的理解是，一切都是本质先于存在，但向前追溯，第一个本质的诞生之前，一定先有存在——源头是存在。
  　　继续推论的话，也就是先存在“人”，再有人的定义、概念——人的存在，先于人的本质，先于各种定义概念思想，先于其他各种物质的存在和本质。
  　　
  　　1人的存在——2人的本质——3其他万物的本质/存在。
  　　哪怕一棵草，也只有先有了人的存在，继而有了人对自己的定义，才会有对称之为一棵草的草的定义。
  　　
  　　3基于1、2之后存在，2决定3.
  　　我很想直接说，2决定3意味着人的思想决定其他万物——当然了1决定2意味着先有人生理结构的存在再有思想的诞生——但是还不能这么说，因为人的本质究竟是何呢？
  　　
  　　还不明确，我会继续的。
•   　　【存在主义】
  　　存在主义是一种使人生成为可能的学说。这里的“成为可能”可以理解为一个萨特的术语“超越”。人类的行动是超越的，那就是说，它总是在现在中孕育，从现在朝向一个未来的目标，我们又在现在中设法实现它。即是抱有希望。它为人类打开了选择的可能性。
  　　【存在先于本质】
  　　萨特说道，存在两种存在主义，一种是基督教的存在主义，另一种这是他和海德格尔等人的无神论的存在主义。无神论者在否定神的存在或者说是悬置神后提出一个关于人的命题，即是存在先于本质。
  　　本质先于存在，可以理解为目的先于存在。萨特以“上帝是造人的工匠”来说明这个命题。工具在工匠制作出之前，人们已经规定了他的用途。为了什么目的，生产什么工具。同理，上帝造人，让人的本质先于了人的存在。萨特这里同时否定了消除上帝之后的上帝的代替物，例如，实践理性、绝对精神等等。上帝死了是从尼采处发端的。但是尼采尽管否认了上帝对人的规定，却依旧提出了一个世界图式（形而上学残余）来规定人。这个图式即是永恒轮回。
  　　存在主义的第一原则，人除了自己认为的那样外，什么都不是。人先存在，而后才选择目的。人是绝对的自由。
  　　【任意与任意的束缚】
  　　人从存在中得到了任意的自由。存在本身即是自由。把上帝对人的规定统统去除，人就是能够自己做出选择的。这里的自由与康德的自由观很相似。但是康德的自由是理性的道德自律。意志即便是自由，它的根据还是在理性那里。理性成为人的意志的规定根据，萨特认为这种普遍的理性是对人的规定和限制是本质，它先于人的存在。
  　　萨特也说明他的出发点是笛卡尔的“我思”。“我思”是自我意识意识到自我的存在。这种意识到的自我是明证的，是不言而喻的。它当之无愧的成为主观哲学的最坚实的出发点。它的确证性在笛卡尔那里、胡塞尔那里、萨特这里都是不可撼动的。由“我思”作为基点，存在是紧接着着而生的。这个时候存在是自由的，因为暂时而言除了存在自身以外什么都是不确定的。存在先于了其他待发现的东西。
  　　然而如果存在是如此自由，而且没有上帝对人进行束缚。那么，“如果上帝不存在，什么事情都将是容许的。”这个时候萨特自然而然的引入了责任概念。在西方的文化中，有一个观念是不证自明的，倘若一个有理性的人他的意志是自由的，那么他要为他的行为负全部的责。萨特认为这种责任是无法逃避的。他有一个概念叫做自欺。他认为自欺往往成为逃避责任的借口。他举了一个神父的例子。你要做一个决定，难以下决心，于是你找到一个神父，从他那里得到了一个指引。那么以后即便这个指引带来了麻烦和困难。你也不能这时把责任推给神父，因为你是选择相信神父，你还要为这行为负责。
  　　这篇论文的目的是为两种对存在主义的责难进行辩驳。其中之一就是基督教认为，取消了上帝，人们可以无恶不为。用责任概念来限制自由是对这种责难的有效反驳。
  　　【孤独境地】
  　　由于萨特的存在根源于笛卡尔的“我思”，而“我思”这个概念本就自然地会带来一个麻烦。那就是主体间性的问题。你正在思考，你的存在是自明的。然而别人是否像你这般清楚明白的存在你是不知道的。也就是共产党（应该是法国共产党吧）对存在主义的责难。你的存在是如此的自由，似乎什么困难都阻拦不了你，你可以选择任何你想选择的东西。那么这不是一种极其强烈的主观性么。萨特的反驳是通过把自由的决定转化为行动来实现的。你虽然选择什么是自由的，但是由于你得为你的自由选择负责，你要付诸实践和行动。而存在也正是在行动中生成的，人在实践中不断完善自我。
  　　【通俗化】
  　　这里需要先摘录两个概念，一个是，“听任”，即决定我们存在的是我么自己。而随同这种听任俱来的是痛苦。“绝望”它是指，我们只能把自己所有的依靠限制在记得意志的范围之内，或者在我们的行为行得通的许多可能性之内。
  　　把萨特的思想通俗的表达是，听任就是我可以自由进行选择，规划我们的人生，但是这时你就有些犹豫和不安，到底这么做好不好，行不行，这来自于对不确定的畏惧。而由于你除了你自己是自明的存在外，别人的状态你是难以明白的。因为别人也有选择的自由，你不知道他人会不会半途倒戈。所以你只能依靠你自己，这就是绝望的感受。
  　　【存疑】
  　　选择是自由的，在这里也就只有选择或者不选择，而不存在一个主观概率的问题。这件事到底有多大的把握，萨特看来不用考虑，去行动就行了。行动之后有什么后果反正都是你要背负的。只要你做好觉悟，选择什么都没有问题。
  　　在这片论文中萨特没有提供过具体的伦理规范，他只提出了他的自由与责任的模式。也就是说，没有对人的规定性的话，很难区分一般的善恶了。好比基督教由于有上帝的支撑，它有明确的教义与信条。康德那里，理性起码也提供了道德律，符合道德律的即是善，虽然道德律是行为规范的规定。
  　　
•   　　
  　　 对存在主义的认识：
  　　
  　　 * 基督教的存在主义，雅思维斯和Gabriel Marcel
  　　 * 无神论者的存在主义，海德格尔与萨特
  　　
  　　 存在主义第一原则：人除了他自己认为的那样以外，什么都不是。
  　　 * 萨特认为：如果上帝不存在，那么至少总有一个东西先于其本质就已经存在了，先要有这么一个东西的存在，然后才能用什么概念来说明它。而这个东西就是人。
  　　 * 也就是说，首先有人，人碰上了自己，在世界上涌现出来——然后才给自己下定义。所以人性是不存在的，因为没有上帝赋予这个人的概念。人就是人，这不仅说是他是他认为的那样，而且也是他愿意成为的那样——是他，从不存在到存在之后愿意成为的那样。
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　 存在主义第一后果：人人明白自己的本来面目，并且把自己存在的责任完全由自己承担下来。
  　　 * 由存在主义第一原则，我们知道，人首先是存在——人在谈得上别的一切之前，首先是一个把自己推向未来的东西，并且感觉到自己在这样做。人确实是一个拥有主观生命的规划，而不是一种苔藓或者一种真菌，或者一颗花椰菜。把自己投降未来之前，什么都不存在。连理性的天堂里都没有他，人只是企图成为什么时才存在。
  　　 * 如何理解萨特的哲学？
  　　 * 安德烈高兹在《致D》中写到一段他与妻子的对话：
  　　 * 对于婚姻我有一种原则性的、观念性的偏见。.......我也一直在说：“什么能够证明，在戒事十年后，我们历经变化，而这种生活的契约仍能满足我们的欲望呢？”
  　　 * 你的回答让我无法抵抗：如果你和一个人结合在一起，打算度过一生，你们就将两个人的生命放在一起，不要做有损你们结合的事情。建构你们夫妻关系就是你们共同的计划，你们永远都需要根据环境的变化而不断地加强、改变、重新调整方向。你们怎么做，就会成为怎样的人。
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　 存在主义第一后果产生的影响：
  　　
  　　 * 人自由了，没有理性，没有道德，也没有上帝，人是自由的。
  　　 * 人跃不出人的主观性。
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　 存在主义第一后果产生的疑问：
  　　
  　　 * 没有了规矩方圆，人自由了，但是怎么保证人是正确的，或者是否有正确这个说法，那么人应该怎么做？
  　　
  　　 * 萨特的回答是；因为自由，我们也能够更好的理解痛苦、听任、绝望。
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　 我们如何理解痛苦？
  　　
  　　 * 存在主义者坦然地说：人是痛苦的。
  　　
  　　 * 他的意思就是，当一个人对一件事情，并且承担责任时，他完全意识到不但是为自己的将来做了抉择，而且通过这一行动同时成为了为全人类作出抉择的立法者。
  　　 * 也就是说人对自己负责的同时，也是为他人负责，在创造一种我希望人人都如此的人的形象。在模铸自己的同时，也模铸了人。
  　　
  　　 * 但反对者会这样认为：并非人人都是这样做的。
  　　 *
  　　 * 萨特的回答是，那个说“并非人人都这样做”从而为自己开脱的说谎者，在某种意义上，肯定了他否定的事情的价值。（就比如，你看到有人把削的苹果皮，倒在了公共洗漱间的水槽里，但是当你要责备这个人的时候，他说：别人也是这样做的。那么他正是否定了这一普世价值。）
  　　 * 而这个人的痛苦，是欲盖弥彰，明知道是错的，却还要为自己捏造理由。
  　　 * 这种痛苦就是克尔凯郭尔所说的：亚伯拉罕的痛苦。
  　　 * 亚伯拉罕式痛苦，就是一个天使命令亚伯拉罕牺牲他的儿子。可是如果是一个现身的真正的天使说：你，亚伯拉罕，牺牲掉你的儿子。那这当然是非遵循不可。可是任何人，遇到了这个情形都会问两个问题：他是真的天使吗？我真的是亚伯拉罕吗？
  　　 * 就好象，有一天你看到一个老奶奶，要过马路，你想“好孩子，就要帮助老奶奶过马路”，可是你又想，这是谁规定的？这个道德是正确的吗？我是好孩子吗？我要成为好孩子吗？
  　　
  　　 * 所以萨特说，人是痛苦的。
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　 我们如何理解听任？
  　　
  　　 * 之前我们讨论了存在主义的第一后果产生的影响，他说，人自由了。
  　　 * 存在主义者认为，人自由了，这是一个极其尴尬的状况。因为没有了上帝，没有了道德，也没有了康德所说的“宇宙法则”，那人虽自由了，但是人也孤独、彷徨、无助了，而我们这时候可以说，人是被迫自由的。所以我们常常说中国人可能是不幸福的，因为中国可能是没有信仰的，是被迫自由的。
  　　 * 这时候，萨特举了一个例子：
  　　
  　　 * 一个年轻的儿子和他母亲相依为命，但是这时战争爆发了，他很明白，他是他母亲的唯一精神支柱，但是他也知道祖国需要他，他可能需要跨过一条艰难的路，去远方服役。忠孝难两全？他应该如何选择？
  　　 * 康德的动机主义理论里有一条：人是目的，而不是手段。
  　　 * 也就是说，当你决定跟一个女生交往的时候，你可能需要考量一下自己的动机。你是否是把她当作你的目的，因为你爱她，你要和她在一起。还是说，因为你寂寞，你空虚，你需要她来弥补你肉体以及精神的空缺。
  　　 * 如果是前者，康德会告诉你，这样是理性的。
  　　 * 可是萨特抨击了这一点，他觉得康德是矛盾的。
  　　 * 他说，你在把一个人当作你的目的的同时，也把他作为成就你对爱情的认知，以及把她作为让你体验爱情的酸甜苦辣的工具。
  　　 * 那么，如果这样的话，我们对价值就没了把握。
  　　
  　　 * 这时候，我们就需要听任：
  　　 *
  　　 * 听任的意思与经济学里的“引导原则”十分相似。也就是，我们从小到大，在我们身边总有一个权威的人，他们是我们的行为榜样。有句俗语叫：有其父必有其子。在叛逆期之前，父亲的权利是很稳定的，父亲的作为往往决定了孩子的价值取向,孩子效仿他的做法，作出一个个选择。而叛逆期开始以后，这段关系逐渐走向崩溃，并且将在另一个地方找到平衡点。而这个过程，正式孩子建立自己的价值观伊始，你发现原来父亲未必是对的，就好象这个世界上有很多人在做一些让你矛盾、困惑的事一样，但同时，你也发现这个世界上不乏具有一定公信力、像道德标杆一样的强者。他们可能是牧师、法官、甚至只是一个普通同学，他们取代了父亲的位置，使你信服。而萨特说，那就去问问这些人吧。
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　 我们如何理解绝望？
  　　 * 在探讨“听任”的时候，我们知道：牧师和法官的答案未必相同，最终我们还是要自己作出决定。我们能让别人做决定么？答案当然是否定的，因为萨特说：你是自由的，所以你选择吧。并且，只有当你行动了，你才存在。你或许会问：选择让别人帮我选择是否是一种选择呢？用一句台词来反驳就是：“如果每个人都向他人要安全感，谁还有多余的安全感给人？“
  　　 * 这样一来，我们只能把自己所有的依靠限制在自己的意识范围之内，我们的选择也将局限于此，超越这界限的部分，是我们无法把握的，所以笛卡尔说：”征服你自己，而不要征服世界“。他的意思就是：我们应当不怀希望地行动。
  　　 * 不怀希望地行动和马克思主义者是相冲突的，马克思主义者认为：你的行动显然是以你的死亡为限，但是你可以倚仗其他人，让他们继承着你的事业继续前进。萨特反对这种态度，他认为既然人是自由的，或许我们可以依赖那些与我们曾一起共同奋斗过的人，但是在那之后呢，我们怎么能知道俄罗斯革命的结果，是否依照马克思的意思呢？所以我们力所能及的范围，就是我们生命的核心，除此之外什么都没有把握。
  　　 * 这就是萨特所说的绝望，存在主义的绝望，那他是否是一个悲观主义者？
  　　 * 萨特说他并非是一个悲观主义者，而是一个严峻的乐观主义者。他不想有人假借存在主义者之名抱怨说：你看，我们就是这样，我们本不怀希望，我们也无能为力。所以在萨特的小说里，他强调，一个人懦弱，并非是由于遗传、环境、精神、或者生理决定的，他也不暗示英雄是与生俱来的。他认为，真正地存在主义者应该说：是懦夫把自己变成了懦夫。因为软弱是人的固有属性，这里说的人的软弱，不同于软弱的人，人的软弱指的是——你作为人，你就是软弱的，软弱是你挥之不去的符号，就是体内流淌的血液一样。但很多人只是当他觉得自己软弱的时候，才承认自己的软弱，这是诡诈，是自欺欺人。
  　　 * 萨特在《一个企业家的童年》写道：”这很有意思，人人都在演戏，爸爸妈妈装扮成爸爸妈妈，妈妈装作很苦恼，因为她的小宝贝吃的太少了，爸爸装作在看报纸。而吕西安自己也在演戏，但是到后来自己也不清楚到底演什么了，演孤儿？还是演吕西安？他望着盛满水的长颈瓶，忽然间，觉得长颈瓶也是装作一只长颈瓶。结果他几乎没有吃菜，他觉得自己很讨厌继续装吕西安了，然而他又不得不装下去。他摔了一跤，隆起了一个大包时，有时会停止哭泣问自己：”我真的疼吗？“于是，他感到更加伤心，哭得更欢乐。
  　　 * 这段写的十分精彩，小主人公吕西安在思考他的存在，他好像是被一个令人信服、强制压抑又不可抗拒的自我完全给占据了，他感觉自己是在操纵自己的傀儡，而傀儡又是他自己。因为他是自由的，他知道并非是上帝在操控着他，而若是他自己，他就不得不陷入了这样绝望的窘境。
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　 人，如何找到自己的出路？
  　　 * 笛卡尔说：我思，故我在。
  　　 * 读萨特的书会发现，萨特受笛卡尔、康德的影响很大。但不同于笛卡尔的是，他认为当我们说”我思”时，我们是当着别人的面找自己，所以我们对于别人以及对于自己都说肯定的，那么那些在我思里面找到自己的人，也发现了别人，并且别人是自己的存在条件。所以萨特在《他人即是地狱》里说：我们在现实中常常身不由己，这个阻碍就是“他人”的目光。“他人”的目光是可怕的，它肆无忌惮的干预我的选择，使我在选择的时候犹豫不决、甚至被迫做出我本不希望的选择，这时他人即是地狱。这与卢梭在《社会契约论》中所提到的：“人生而自由，但却无不在枷锁之中“在字面上不谋而合。
  　　 * 那是否我们可以逃离“自由的炼狱”与“自由的枷锁”？答案是：不能。
  　　 * 存在主义的核心思想是自由承担责任，通过承担，任何人在体现一种人的类型的同时，也在体现他自己。而我们每个人，通过呼吸、吃喝、睡觉或者随便任何一种行动方式，都在创造绝对。
  　　 * 所以他在《存在主义是一种人道主义》中做了一个比喻：道德的抉择像一件艺术品的制作。因为我们不能预知应当做什么。我们也不能判断别人，什么是正确的，什么是错误的。但我们知道，艺术脱离不了发明他的人，他们正是绑定在了一起，才有了艺术价值。而生活本身，在人未到达的地方，是没有内容的，而他的价值恰恰是你选择他的意义。
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　——————————————————————————
  　　
  　　马哲课的讲稿
  　　主要是把这本书搬运、整理了一遍
  　　可能存在一些问题
  　　
•   　　Jean-Paul Sartre 1946
  　　Existentialism Is a Humanism
  　　________________________________________
  　　Written: Lecture given in 1946
  　　Source: Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufman, Meridian Publishing Company, 1989;
  　　First Published: World Publishing Company in 1956;
  　　Translator: Philip Mairet;
  　　Copyright: reproduced under the “Fair Use” provisions;
  　　HTML Markup: by Andy Blunden 1998; proofed and corrected February 2005.
  　　________________________________________
  　　My purpose here is to offer a defence of existentialism against several reproaches that have been laid against it.
  　　First, it has been reproached as an invitation to people to dwell in quietism of despair. For if every way to a solution is barred, one would have to regard any action in this world as entirely ineffective, and one would arrive finally at a contemplative philosophy. Moreover, since contemplation is a luxury, this would be only another bourgeois philosophy. This is, especially, the reproach made by the Communists.
  　　From another quarter we are reproached for having underlined all that is ignominious in the human situation, for depicting what is mean, sordid or base to the neglect of certain things that possess charm and beauty and belong to the brighter side of human nature: for example, according to the Catholic critic, Mlle. Mercier, we forget how an infant smiles. Both from this side and from the other we are also reproached for leaving out of account the solidarity of mankind and considering man in isolation. And this, say the Communists, is because we base our doctrine upon pure subjectivity – upon the Cartesian “I think”: which is the moment in which solitary man attains to himself; a position from which it is impossible to regain solidarity with other men who exist outside of the self. The ego cannot reach them through the cogito.
  　　From the Christian side, we are reproached as people who deny the reality and seriousness of human affairs. For since we ignore the commandments of God and all values prescribed as eternal, nothing remains but what is strictly voluntary. Everyone can do what he likes, and will be incapable, from such a point of view, of condemning either the point of view or the action of anyone else.
  　　It is to these various reproaches that I shall endeavour to reply today; that is why I have entitled this brief exposition “Existentialism is a Humanism.” Many may be surprised at the mention of humanism in this connection, but we shall try to see in what sense we understand it. In any case, we can begin by saying that existentialism, in our sense of the word, is a doctrine that does render human life possible; a doctrine, also, which affirms that every truth and every action imply both an environment and a human subjectivity. The essential charge laid against us is, of course, that of over-emphasis upon the evil side of human life. I have lately been told of a lady who, whenever she lets slip a vulgar expression in a moment of nervousness, excuses herself by exclaiming, “I believe I am becoming an existentialist.” So it appears that ugliness is being identified with existentialism. That is why some people say we are “naturalistic,” and if we are, it is strange to see how much we scandalise and horrify them, for no one seems to be much frightened or humiliated nowadays by what is properly called naturalism. Those who can quite well keep down a novel by Zola such as La Terre are sickened as soon as they read an existentialist novel. Those who appeal to the wisdom of the people – which is a sad wisdom – find ours sadder still. And yet, what could be more disillusioned than such sayings as “Charity begins at home” or “Promote a rogue and he’ll sue you for damage, knock him down and he’ll do you homage”? We all know how many common sayings can be quoted to this effect, and they all mean much the same – that you must not oppose the powers that be; that you must not fight against superior force; must not meddle in matters that are above your station. Or that any action not in accordance with some tradition is mere romanticism; or that any undertaking which has not the support of proven experience is foredoomed to frustration; and that since experience has shown men to be invariably inclined to evil, there must be firm rules to restrain them, otherwise we shall have anarchy. It is, however, the people who are forever mouthing these dismal proverbs and, whenever they are told of some more or less repulsive action, say “How like human nature!” – it is these very people, always harping upon realism, who complain that existentialism is too gloomy a view of things. Indeed their excessive protests make me suspect that what is annoying them is not so much our pessimism, but, much more likely, our optimism. For at bottom, what is alarming in the doctrine that I am about to try to explain to you is – is it not? – that it confronts man with a possibility of choice. To verify this, let us review the whole question upon the strictly philosophic level. What, then, is this that we call existentialism?
  　　Most of those who are making use of this word would be highly confused if required to explain its meaning. For since it has become fashionable, people cheerfully declare that this musician or that painter is “existentialist.” A columnist in Clartes signs himself “The Existentialist,” and, indeed, the word is now so loosely applied to so many things that it no longer means anything at all. It would appear that, for the lack of any novel doctrine such as that of surrealism, all those who are eager to join in the latest scandal or movement now seize upon this philosophy in which, however, they can find nothing to their purpose. For in truth this is of all teachings the least scandalous and the most austere: it is intended strictly for technicians and philosophers. All the same, it can easily be defined.
  　　The question is only complicated because there are two kinds of existentialists. There are, on the one hand, the Christians, amongst whom I shall name Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel, both professed Catholics; and on the other the existential atheists, amongst whom we must place Heidegger as well as the French existentialists and myself. What they have in common is simply the fact that they believe that existence comes before essence – or, if you will, that we must begin from the subjective. What exactly do we mean by that?
  　　If one considers an article of manufacture as, for example, a book or a paper-knife – one sees that it has been made by an artisan who had a conception of it; and he has paid attention, equally, to the conception of a paper-knife and to the pre-existent technique of production which is a part of that conception and is, at bottom, a formula. Thus the paper-knife is at the same time an article producible in a certain manner and one which, on the other hand, serves a definite purpose, for one cannot suppose that a man would produce a paper-knife without knowing what it was for. Let us say, then, of the paperknife that its essence – that is to say the sum of the formulae and the qualities which made its production and its definition possible – precedes its existence. The presence of such-and-such a paper-knife or book is thus determined before my eyes. Here, then, we are viewing the world from a technical standpoint, and we can say that production precedes existence.
  　　When we think of God as the creator, we are thinking of him, most of the time, as a supernal artisan. Whatever doctrine we may be considering, whether it be a doctrine like that of Descartes, or of Leibnitz himself, we always imply that the will follows, more or less, from the understanding or at least accompanies it, so that when God creates he knows precisely what he is creating. Thus, the conception of man in the mind of God is comparable to that of the paper-knife in the mind of the artisan: God makes man according to a procedure and a conception, exactly as the artisan manufactures a paper-knife, following a definition and a formula. Thus each individual man is the realisation of a certain conception which dwells in the divine understanding. In the philosophic atheism of the eighteenth century, the notion of God is suppressed, but not, for all that, the idea that essence is prior to existence; something of that idea we still find everywhere, in Diderot, in Voltaire and even in Kant. Man possesses a human nature; that “human nature,” which is the conception of human being, is found in every man; which means that each man is a particular example of a universal conception, the conception of Man. In Kant, this universality goes so far that the wild man of the woods, man in the state of nature and the bourgeois are all contained in the same definition and have the same fundamental qualities. Here again, the essence of man precedes that historic existence which we confront in experience.
  　　Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, declares with greater consistency that if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man or, as Heidegger has it, the human reality. What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards. If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing – as he wills to be after that leap towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism. And this is what people call its “subjectivity,” using the word as a reproach against us. But what do we mean to say by this, but that man is of a greater dignity than a stone or a table? For we mean to say that man primarily exists – that man is, before all else, something which propels itself towards a future and is aware that it is doing so. Man is, indeed, a project which possesses a subjective life, instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus or a cauliflower. Before that projection of the self nothing exists; not even in the heaven of intelligence: man will only attain existence when he is what he purposes to be. Not, however, what he may wish to be. For what we usually understand by wishing or willing is a conscious decision taken – much more often than not – after we have made ourselves what we are. I may wish to join a party, to write a book or to marry – but in such a case what is usually called my will is probably a manifestation of a prior and more spontaneous decision. If, however, it is true that existence is prior to essence, man is responsible for what he is. Thus, the first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders. And, when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men. The word “subjectivism” is to be understood in two senses, and our adversaries play upon only one of them. Subjectivism means, on the one hand, the freedom of the individual subject and, on the other, that man cannot pass beyond human subjectivity. It is the latter which is the deeper meaning of existentialism. When we say that man chooses himself, we do mean that every one of us must choose himself; but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he chooses for all men. For in effect, of all the actions a man may take in order to create himself as he wills to be, there is not one which is not creative, at the same time, of an image of man such as he believes he ought to be. To choose between this or that is at the same time to affirm the value of that which is chosen; for we are unable ever to choose the worse. What we choose is always the better; and nothing can be better for us unless it is better for all. If, moreover, existence precedes essence and we will to exist at the same time as we fashion our image, that image is valid for all and for the entire epoch in which we find ourselves. Our responsibility is thus much greater than we had supposed, for it concerns mankind as a whole. If I am a worker, for instance, I may choose to join a Christian rather than a Communist trade union. And if, by that membership, I choose to signify that resignation is, after all, the attitude that best becomes a man, that man’s kingdom is not upon this earth, I do not commit myself alone to that view. Resignation is my will for everyone, and my action is, in consequence, a commitment on behalf of all mankind. Or if, to take a more personal case, I decide to marry and to have children, even though this decision proceeds simply from my situation, from my passion or my desire, I am thereby committing not only myself, but humanity as a whole, to the practice of monogamy. I am thus responsible for myself and for all men, and I am creating a certain image of man as I would have him to be. In fashioning myself I fashion man.
  　　This may enable us to understand what is meant by such terms – perhaps a little grandiloquent – as anguish, abandonment and despair. As you will soon see, it is very simple. First, what do we mean by anguish? – The existentialist frankly states that man is in anguish. His meaning is as follows: When a man commits himself to anything, fully realising that he is not only choosing what he will be, but is thereby at the same time a legislator deciding for the whole of mankind – in such a moment a man cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility. There are many, indeed, who show no such anxiety. But we affirm that they are merely disguising their anguish or are in flight from it. Certainly, many people think that in what they are doing they commit no one but themselves to anything: and if you ask them, “What would happen if everyone did so?” they shrug their shoulders and reply, “Everyone does not do so.” But in truth, one ought always to ask oneself what would happen if everyone did as one is doing; nor can one escape from that disturbing thought except by a kind of self-deception. The man who lies in self-excuse, by saying “Everyone will not do it” must be ill at ease in his conscience, for the act of lying implies the universal value which it denies. By its very disguise his anguish reveals itself. This is the anguish that Kierkegaard called “the anguish of Abraham.” You know the story: An angel commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son; and obedience was obligatory, if it really was an angel who had appeared and said, “Thou, Abraham, shalt sacrifice thy son.” But anyone in such a case would wonder, first, whether it was indeed an angel and secondly, whether I am really Abraham. Where are the proofs? A certain mad woman who suffered from hallucinations said that people were telephoning to her, and giving her orders. The doctor asked, “But who is it that speaks to you?” She replied: “He says it is God.” And what, indeed, could prove to her that it was God? If an angel appears to me, what is the proof that it is an angel; or, if I hear voices, who can prove that they proceed from heaven and not from hell, or from my own subconsciousness or some pathological condition? Who can prove that they are really addressed to me?
  　　Who, then, can prove that I am the proper person to impose, by my own choice, my conception of man upon mankind? I shall never find any proof whatever; there will be no sign to convince me of it. If a voice speaks to me, it is still I myself who must decide whether the voice is or is not that of an angel. If I regard a certain course of action as good, it is only I who choose to say that it is good and not bad. There is nothing to show that I am Abraham: nevertheless I also am obliged at every instant to perform actions which are examples. Everything happens to every man as though the whole human race had its eyes fixed upon what he is doing and regulated its conduct accordingly. So every man ought to say, “Am I really a man who has the right to act in such a manner that humanity regulates itself by what I do.” If a man does not say that, he is dissembling his anguish. Clearly, the anguish with which we are concerned here is not one that could lead to quietism or inaction. It is anguish pure and simple, of the kind well known to all those who have borne responsibilities. When, for instance, a military leader takes upon himself the responsibility for an attack and sends a number of men to their death, he chooses to do it and at bottom he alone chooses. No doubt under a higher command, but its orders, which are more general, require interpretation by him and upon that interpretation depends the life of ten, fourteen or twenty men. In making the decision, he cannot but feel a certain anguish. All leaders know that anguish. It does not prevent their acting, on the contrary it is the very condition of their action, for the action presupposes that there is a plurality of possibilities, and in choosing one of these, they realize that it has value only because it is chosen. Now it is anguish of that kind which existentialism describes, and moreover, as we shall see, makes explicit through direct responsibility towards other men who are concerned. Far from being a screen which could separate us from action, it is a condition of action itself.
  　　And when we speak of “abandonment” – a favorite word of Heidegger – we only mean to say that God does not exist, and that it is necessary to draw the consequences of his absence right to the end. The existentialist is strongly opposed to a certain type of secular moralism which seeks to suppress God at the least possible expense. Towards 1880, when the French professors endeavoured to formulate a secular morality, they said something like this: God is a useless and costly hypothesis, so we will do without it. However, if we are to have morality, a society and a law-abiding world, it is essential that certain values should be taken seriously; they must have an a priori existence ascribed to them. It must be considered obligatory a priori to be honest, not to lie, not to beat one’s wife, to bring up children and so forth; so we are going to do a little work on this subject, which will enable us to show that these values exist all the same, inscribed in an intelligible heaven although, of course, there is no God. In other words – and this is, I believe, the purport of all that we in France call radicalism – nothing will be changed if God does not exist; we shall rediscover the same norms of honesty, progress and humanity, and we shall have disposed of God as an out-of-date hypothesis which will die away quietly of itself. The existentialist, on the contrary, finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is nowhere written that “the good” exists, that one must be honest or must not lie, since we are now upon the plane where there are only men. Dostoevsky once wrote: “If God did not exist, everything would be permitted”; and that, for existentialism, is the starting point. Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself. He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one’s action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism – man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimise our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. – We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does. The existentialist does not believe in the power of passion. He will never regard a grand passion as a destructive torrent upon which a man is swept into certain actions as by fate, and which, therefore, is an excuse for them. He thinks that man is responsible for his passion. Neither will an existentialist think that a man can find help through some sign being vouchsafed upon earth for his orientation: for he thinks that the man himself interprets the sign as he chooses. He thinks that every man, without any support or help whatever, is condemned at every instant to invent man. As Ponge has written in a very fine article, “Man is the future of man.” That is exactly true. Only, if one took this to mean that the future is laid up in Heaven, that God knows what it is, it would be false, for then it would no longer even be a future. If, however, it means that, whatever man may now appear to be, there is a future to be fashioned, a virgin future that awaits him – then it is a true saying. But in the present one is forsaken.
  　　As an example by which you may the better understand this state of abandonment, I will refer to the case of a pupil of mine, who sought me out in the following circumstances. His father was quarrelling with his mother and was also inclined to be a “collaborator”; his elder brother had been killed in the German offensive of 1940 and this young man, with a sentiment somewhat primitive but generous, burned to avenge him. His mother was living alone with him, deeply afflicted by the semi-treason of his father and by the death of her eldest son, and her one consolation was in this young man. But he, at this moment, had the choice between going to England to join the Free French Forces or of staying near his mother and helping her to live. He fully realised that this woman lived only for him and that his disappearance – or perhaps his death – would plunge her into despair. He also realised that, concretely and in fact, every action he performed on his mother’s behalf would be sure of effect in the sense of aiding her to live, whereas anything he did in order to go and fight would be an ambiguous action which might vanish like water into sand and serve no purpose. For instance, to set out for England he would have to wait indefinitely in a Spanish camp on the way through Spain; or, on arriving in England or in Algiers he might be put into an office to fill up forms. Consequently, he found himself confronted by two very different modes of action; the one concrete, immediate, but directed towards only one individual; and the other an action addressed to an end infinitely greater, a national collectivity, but for that very reason ambiguous – and it might be frustrated on the way. At the same time, he was hesitating between two kinds of morality; on the one side the morality of sympathy, of personal devotion and, on the other side, a morality of wider scope but of more debatable validity. He had to choose between those two. What could help him to choose? Could the Christian doctrine? No. Christian doctrine says: Act with charity, love your neighbour, deny yourself for others, choose the way which is hardest, and so forth. But which is the harder road? To whom does one owe the more brotherly love, the patriot or the mother? Which is the more useful aim, the general one of fighting in and for the whole community, or the precise aim of helping one particular person to live? Who can give an answer to that a priori? No one. Nor is it given in any ethical scripture. The Kantian ethic says, Never regard another as a means, but always as an end. Very well; if I remain with my mother, I shall be regarding her as the end and not as a means: but by the same token I am in danger of treating as means those who are fighting on my behalf; and the converse is also true, that if I go to the aid of the combatants I shall be treating them as the end at the risk of treating my mother as a means. If values are uncertain, if they are still too abstract to determine the particular, concrete case under consideration, nothing remains but to trust in our instincts. That is what this young man tried to do; and when I saw him he said, “In the end, it is feeling that counts; the direction in which it is really pushing me is the one I ought to choose. If I feel that I love my mother enough to sacrifice everything else for her – my will to be avenged, all my longings for action and adventure then I stay with her. If, on the contrary, I feel that my love for her is not enough, I go.” But how does one estimate the strength of a feeling? The value of his feeling for his mother was determined precisely by the fact that he was standing by her. I may say that I love a certain friend enough to sacrifice such or such a sum of money for him, but I cannot prove that unless I have done it. I may say, “I love my mother enough to remain with her,” if actually I have remained with her. I can only estimate the strength of this affection if I have performed an action by which it is defined and ratified. But if I then appeal to this affection to justify my action, I find myself drawn into a vicious circle.
  　　Moreover, as Gide has very well said, a sentiment which is play-acting and one which is vital are two things that are hardly distinguishable one from another. To decide that I love my mother by staying beside her, and to play a comedy the upshot of which is that I do so – these are nearly the same thing. In other words, feeling is formed by the deeds that one does; therefore I cannot consult it as a guide to action. And that is to say that I can neither seek within myself for an authentic impulse to action, nor can I expect, from some ethic, formulae that will enable me to act. You may say that the youth did, at least, go to a professor to ask for advice. But if you seek counsel – from a priest, for example you have selected that priest; and at bottom you already knew, more or less, what he would advise. In other words, to choose an adviser is nevertheless to commit oneself by that choice. If you are a Christian, you will say, consult a priest; but there are collaborationists, priests who are resisters and priests who wait for the tide to turn: which will you choose? Had this young man chosen a priest of the resistance, or one of the collaboration, he would have decided beforehand the kind of advice he was to receive. Similarly, in coming to me, he knew what advice I should give him, and I had but one reply to make. You are free, therefore choose, that is to say, invent. No rule of general morality can show you what you ought to do: no signs are vouchsafed in this world. The Catholics will reply, “Oh, but they are!” Very well; still, it is I myself, in every case, who have to interpret the signs. While I was imprisoned, I made the acquaintance of a somewhat remarkable man, a Jesuit, who had become a member of that order in the following manner. In his life he had suffered a succession of rather severe setbacks. His father had died when he was a child, leaving him in poverty, and he had been awarded a free scholarship in a religious institution, where he had been made continually to feel that he was accepted for charity’s sake, and, in consequence, he had been denied several of those distinctions and honours which gratify children. Later, about the age of eighteen, he came to grief in a sentimental affair; and finally, at twenty-two – this was a trifle in itself, but it was the last drop that overflowed his cup – he failed in his military examination. This young man, then, could regard himself as a total failure: it was a sign – but a sign of what? He might have taken refuge in bitterness or despair. But he took it – very cleverly for him – as a sign that he was not intended for secular success, and that only the attainments of religion, those of sanctity and of faith, were accessible to him. He interpreted his record as a message from God, and became a member of the Order. Who can doubt but that this decision as to the meaning of the sign was his, and his alone? One could have drawn quite different conclusions from such a series of reverses – as, for example, that he had better become a carpenter or a revolutionary. For the decipherment of the sign, however, he bears the entire responsibility. That is what “abandonment” implies, that we ourselves decide our being. And with this abandonment goes anguish.
  　　As for “despair,” the meaning of this expression is extremely simple. It merely means that we limit ourselves to a reliance upon that which is within our wills, or within the sum of the probabilities which render our action feasible. Whenever one wills anything, there are always these elements of probability. If I am counting upon a visit from a friend, who may be coming by train or by tram, I presuppose that the train will arrive at the appointed time, or that the tram will not be derailed. I remain in the realm of possibilities; but one does not rely upon any possibilities beyond those that are strictly concerned in one’s action. Beyond the point at which the possibilities under consideration cease to affect my action, I ought to disinterest myself. For there is no God and no prevenient design, which can adapt the world and all its possibilities to my will. When Descartes said, “Conquer yourself rather than the world,” what he meant was, at bottom, the same – that we should act without hope.
  　　Marxists, to whom I have said this, have answered: “Your action is limited, obviously, by your death; but you can rely upon the help of others. That is, you can count both upon what the others are doing to help you elsewhere, as in China and in Russia, and upon what they will do later, after your death, to take up your action and carry it forward to its final accomplishment which will be the revolution. Moreover you must rely upon this; not to do so is immoral.” To this I rejoin, first, that I shall always count upon my comrades-in-arms in the struggle, in so far as they are committed, as I am, to a definite, common cause; and in the unity of a party or a group which I can more or less control – that is, in which I am enrolled as a militant and whose movements at every moment are known to me. In that respect, to rely upon the unity and the will of the party is exactly like my reckoning that the train will run to time or that the tram will not be derailed. But I cannot count upon men whom I do not know, I cannot base my confidence upon human goodness or upon man’s interest in the good of society, seeing that man is free and that there is no human nature which I can take as foundational. I do not know where the Russian revolution will lead. I can admire it and take it as an example in so far as it is evident, today, that the proletariat plays a part in Russia which it has attained in no other nation. But I cannot affirm that this will necessarily lead to the triumph of the proletariat: I must confine myself to what I can see. Nor can I be sure that comrades-in-arms will take up my work after my death and carry it to the maximum perfection, seeing that those men are free agents and will freely decide, tomorrow, what man is then to be. Tomorrow, after my death, some men may decide to establish Fascism, and the others may be so cowardly or so slack as to let them do so. If so, Fascism will then be the truth of man, and so much the worse for us. In reality, things will be such as men have decided they shall be. Does that mean that I should abandon myself to quietism? No. First I ought to commit myself and then act my commitment, according to the time-honoured formula that “one need not hope in order to undertake one’s work.” Nor does this mean that I should not belong to a party, but only that I should be without illusion and that I should do what I can. For instance, if I ask myself “Will the social ideal as such, ever become a reality?” I cannot tell, I only know that whatever may be in my power to make it so, I shall do; beyond that, I can count upon nothing.
  　　Quietism is the attitude of people who say, “let others do what I cannot do.” The doctrine I am presenting before you is precisely the opposite of this, since it declares that there is no reality except in action. It goes further, indeed, and adds, “Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists only in so far as he realises himself, he is therefore nothing else but the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is.” Hence we can well understand why some people are horrified by our teaching. For many have but one resource to sustain them in their misery, and that is to think, “Circumstances have been against me, I was worthy to be something much better than I have been. I admit I have never had a great love or a great friendship; but that is because I never met a man or a woman who were worthy of it; if I have not written any very good books, it is because I had not the leisure to do so; or, if I have had no children to whom I could devote myself it is because I did not find the man I could have lived with. So there remains within me a wide range of abilities, inclinations and potentialities, unused but perfectly viable, which endow me with a worthiness that could never be inferred from the mere history of my actions.” But in reality and for the existentialist, there is no love apart from the deeds of love; no potentiality of love other than that which is manifested in loving; there is no genius other than that which is expressed in works of art. The genius of Proust is the totality of the works of Proust; the genius of Racine is the series of his tragedies, outside of which there is nothing. Why should we attribute to Racine the capacity to write yet another tragedy when that is precisely what he did not write? In life, a man commits himself, draws his own portrait and there is nothing but that portrait. No doubt this thought may seem comfortless to one who has not made a success of his life. On the other hand, it puts everyone in a position to understand that reality alone is reliable; that dreams, expectations and hopes serve to define a man only as deceptive dreams, abortive hopes, expectations unfulfilled; that is to say, they define him negatively, not positively. Nevertheless, when one says, “You are nothing else but what you live,” it does not imply that an artist is to be judged solely by his works of art, for a thousand other things contribute no less to his definition as a man. What we mean to say is that a man is no other than a series of undertakings, that he is the sum, the organisation, the set of relations that constitute these undertakings.
  　　In the light of all this, what people reproach us with is not, after all, our pessimism, but the sternness of our optimism. If people condemn our works of fiction, in which we describe characters that are base, weak, cowardly and sometimes even frankly evil, it is not only because those characters are base, weak, cowardly or evil. For suppose that, like Zola, we showed that the behaviour of these characters was caused by their heredity, or by the action of their environment upon them, or by determining factors, psychic or organic. People would be reassured, they would say, “You see, that is what we are like, no one can do anything about it.” But the existentialist, when he portrays a coward, shows him as responsible for his cowardice. He is not like that on account of a cowardly heart or lungs or cerebrum, he has not become like that through his physiological organism; he is like that because he has made himself into a coward by actions. There is no such thing as a cowardly temperament. There are nervous temperaments; there is what is called impoverished blood, and there are also rich temperaments. But the man whose blood is poor is not a coward for all that, for what produces cowardice is the act of giving up or giving way; and a temperament is not an action. A coward is defined by the deed that he has done. What people feel obscurely, and with horror, is that the coward as we present him is guilty of being a coward. What people would prefer would be to be born either a coward or a hero. One of the charges most often laid against the Chemins de la Liberté is something like this: “But, after all, these people being so base, how can you make them into heroes?” That objection is really rather comic, for it implies that people are born heroes: and that is, at bottom, what such people would like to think. If you are born cowards, you can be quite content, you can do nothing about it and you will be cowards all your lives whatever you do; and if you are born heroes you can again be quite content; you will be heroes all your lives eating and drinking heroically. Whereas the existentialist says that the coward makes himself cowardly, the hero makes himself heroic; and that there is always a possibility for the coward to give up cowardice and for the hero to stop being a hero. What counts is the total commitment, and it is not by a particular case or particular action that you are committed altogether.
  　　We have now, I think, dealt with a certain number of the reproaches against existentialism. You have seen that it cannot be regarded as a philosophy of quietism since it defines man by his action; nor as a pessimistic description of man, for no doctrine is more optimistic, the destiny of man is placed within himself. Nor is it an attempt to discourage man from action since it tells him that there is no hope except in his action, and that the one thing which permits him to have life is the deed. Upon this level therefore, what we are considering is an ethic of action and self-commitment. However, we are still reproached, upon these few data, for confining man within his individual subjectivity. There again people badly misunderstand us.
  　　Our point of departure is, indeed, the subjectivity of the individual, and that for strictly philosophic reasons. It is not because we are bourgeois, but because we seek to base our teaching upon the truth, and not upon a collection of fine theories, full of hope but lacking real foundations. And at the point of departure there cannot be any other truth than this, I think, therefore I am, which is the absolute truth of consciousness as it attains to itself. Every theory which begins with man, outside of this moment of self-attainment, is a theory which thereby suppresses the truth, for outside of the Cartesian cogito, all objects are no more than probable, and any doctrine of probabilities which is not attached to a truth will crumble into nothing. In order to define the probable one must possess the true. Before there can be any truth whatever, then, there must be an absolute truth, and there is such a truth which is simple, easily attained and within the reach of everybody; it consists in one’s immediate sense of one’s self.
  　　In the second place, this theory alone is compatible with the dignity of man, it is the only one which does not make man into an object. All kinds of materialism lead one to treat every man including oneself as an object – that is, as a set of pre-determined reactions, in no way different from the patterns of qualities and phenomena which constitute a table, or a chair or a stone. Our aim is precisely to establish the human kingdom as a pattern of values in distinction from the material world. But the subjectivity which we thus postulate as the standard of truth is no narrowly individual subjectivism, for as we have demonstrated, it is not only one’s own self that one discovers in the cogito, but those of others too. Contrary to the philosophy of Descartes, contrary to that of Kant, when we say “I think” we are attaining to ourselves in the presence of the other, and we are just as certain of the other as we are of ourselves. Thus the man who discovers himself directly in thecogito also discovers all the others, and discovers them as the condition of his own existence. He recognises that he cannot be anything (in the sense in which one says one is spiritual, or that one is wicked or jealous) unless others recognise him as such. I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever about myself, except through the mediation of another. The other is indispensable to my existence, and equally so to any knowledge I can have of myself. Under these conditions, the intimate discovery of myself is at the same time the revelation of the other as a freedom which confronts mine, and which cannot think or will without doing so either for or against me. Thus, at once, we find ourselves in a world which is, let us say, that of “inter-subjectivity”. It is in this world that man has to decide what he is and what others are.
  　　Furthermore, although it is impossible to find in each and every man a universal essence that can be called human nature, there is nevertheless a human universality of condition. It is not by chance that the thinkers of today are so much more ready to speak of the condition than of the nature of man. By his condition they understand, with more or less clarity, all the limitations which a priori define man’s fundamental situation in the universe. His historical situations are variable: man may be born a slave in a pagan society or may be a feudal baron, or a proletarian. But what never vary are the necessities of being in the world, of having to labor and to die there. These limitations are neither subjective nor objective, or rather there is both a subjective and an objective aspect of them. Objective, because we meet with them everywhere and they are everywhere recognisable: and subjective because they are lived and are nothing if man does not live them – if, that is to say, he does not freely determine himself and his existence in relation to them. And, diverse though man’s purpose may be, at least none of them is wholly foreign to me, since every human purpose presents itself as an attempt either to surpass these limitations, or to widen them, or else to deny or to accommodate oneself to them. Consequently every purpose, however individual it may be, is of universal value. Every purpose, even that of a Chinese, an Indian or a Negro, can be understood by a European. To say it can be understood, means that the European of 1945 may be striving out of a certain situation towards the same limitations in the same way, and that he may reconceive in himself the purpose of the Chinese, of the Indian or the African. In every purpose there is universality, in this sense that every purpose is comprehensible to every man. Not that this or that purpose defines man for ever, but that it may be entertained again and again. There is always some way of understanding an idiot, a child, a primitive man or a foreigner if one has sufficient information. In this sense we may say that there is a human universality, but it is not something given; it is being perpetually made. I make this universality in choosing myself; I also make it by understanding the purpose of any other man, of whatever epoch. This absoluteness of the act of choice does not alter the relativity of each epoch.
  　　What is at the very heart and center of existentialism, is the absolute character of the free commitment, by which every man realises himself in realising a type of humanity – a commitment always understandable, to no matter whom in no matter what epoch – and its bearing upon the relativity of the cultural pattern which may result from such absolute commitment. One must observe equally the relativity of Cartesianism and the absolute character of the Cartesian commitment. In this sense you may say, if you like, that every one of us makes the absolute by breathing, by eating, by sleeping or by behaving in any fashion whatsoever. There is no difference between free being – being as self-committal, as existence choosing its essence – and absolute being. And there is no difference whatever between being as an absolute, temporarily localised that is, localised in history – and universally intelligible being.
  　　This does not completely refute the charge of subjectivism. Indeed that objection appears in several other forms, of which the first is as follows. People say to us, “Then it does not matter what you do,” and they say this in various ways.
  　　First they tax us with anarchy; then they say, “You cannot judge others, for there is no reason for preferring one purpose to another”; finally, they may say, “Everything being merely voluntary in this choice of yours, you give away with one hand what you pretend to gain with the other.” These three are not very serious objections. As to the first, to say that it does not matter what you choose is not correct. In one sense choice is possible, but what is not possible is not to choose. I can always choose, but I must know that if I do not choose, that is still a choice. This, although it may appear merely formal, is of great importance as a limit to fantasy and caprice. For, when I confront a real situation – for example, that I am a sexual being, able to have relations with a being of the other sex and able to have children – I am obliged to choose my attitude to it, and in every respect I bear the responsibility of the choice which, in committing myself, also commits the whole of humanity. Even if my choice is determined by no a priori value whatever, it can have nothing to do with caprice: and if anyone thinks that this is only Gide’s theory of the acte gratuit over again, he has failed to see the enormous difference between this theory and that of Gide. Gide does not know what a situation is, his “act” is one of pure caprice. In our view, on the contrary, man finds himself in an organised situation in which he is himself involved: his choice involves mankind in its entirety, and he cannot avoid choosing. Either he must remain single, or he must marry without having children, or he must marry and have children. In any case, and whichever he may choose, it is impossible for him, in respect of this situation, not to take complete responsibility. Doubtless he chooses without reference to any pre-established value, but it is unjust to tax him with caprice. Rather let us say that the moral choice is comparable to the construction of a work of art.
  　　But here I must at once digress to make it quite clear that we are not propounding an aesthetic morality, for our adversaries are disingenuous enough to reproach us even with that. I mention the work of art only by way of comparison. That being understood, does anyone reproach an artist, when he paints a picture, for not following rules established a priori. Does one ever ask what is the picture that he ought to paint? As everyone knows, there is no pre-defined picture for him to make; the artist applies himself to the composition of a picture, and the picture that ought to be made is precisely that which he will have made. As everyone knows, there are no aesthetic values a priori, but there are values which will appear in due course in the coherence of the picture, in the relation between the will to create and the finished work. No one can tell what the painting of tomorrow will be like; one cannot judge a painting until it is done. What has that to do with morality? We are in the same creative situation. We never speak of a work of art as irresponsible; when we are discussing a canvas by Picasso, we understand very well that the composition became what it is at the time when he was painting it, and that his works are part and parcel of his entire life.
  　　It is the same upon the plane of morality. There is this in common between art and morality, that in both we have to do with creation and invention. We cannot decide a priori what it is that should be done. I think it was made sufficiently clear to you in the case of that student who came to see me, that to whatever ethical system he might appeal, the Kantian or any other, he could find no sort of guidance whatever; he was obliged to invent the law for himself. Certainly we cannot say that this man, in choosing to remain with his mother – that is, in taking sentiment, personal devotion and concrete charity as his moral foundations – would be making an irresponsible choice, nor could we do so if he preferred the sacrifice of going away to England. Man makes himself; he is not found ready-made; he makes himself by the choice of his morality, and he cannot but choose a morality, such is the pressure of circumstances upon him. We define man only in relation to his commitments; it is therefore absurd to reproach us for irresponsibility in our choice.
  　　In the second place, people say to us, “You are unable to judge others.” This is true in one sense and false in another. It is true in this sense, that whenever a man chooses his purpose and his commitment in all clearness and in all sincerity, whatever that purpose may be, it is impossible for him to prefer another. It is true in the sense that we do not believe in progress. Progress implies amelioration; but man is always the same, facing a situation which is always changing, and choice remains always a choice in the situation. The moral problem has not changed since the time when it was a choice between slavery and anti-slavery – from the time of the war of Secession, for example, until the present moment when one chooses between the M.R.P. [Mouvement Republicain Poputaire] and the Communists.
  　　We can judge, nevertheless, for, as I have said, one chooses in view of others, and in view of others one chooses himself. One can judge, first – and perhaps this is not a judgment of value, but it is a logical judgment – that in certain cases choice is founded upon an error, and in others upon the truth. One can judge a man by saying that he deceives himself. Since we have defined the situation of man as one of free choice, without excuse and without help, any man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passions, or by inventing some deterministic doctrine, is a self-deceiver. One may object: “But why should he not choose to deceive himself?” I reply that it is not for me to judge him morally, but I define his self-deception as an error. Here one cannot avoid pronouncing a judgment of truth. The self-deception is evidently a falsehood, because it is a dissimulation of man’s complete liberty of commitment. Upon this same level, I say that it is also a self-deception if I choose to declare that certain values are incumbent upon me; I am in contradiction with myself if I will these values and at the same time say that they impose themselves upon me. If anyone says to me, “And what if I wish to deceive myself?” I answer, “There is no reason why you should not, but I declare that you are doing so, and that the attitude of strict consistency alone is that of good faith.” Furthermore, I can pronounce a moral judgment. For I declare that freedom, in respect of concrete circumstances, can have no other end and aim but itself; and when once a man has seen that values depend upon himself, in that state of forsakenness he can will only one thing, and that is freedom as the foundation of all values. That does not mean that he wills it in the abstract: it simply means that the actions of men of good faith have, as their ultimate significance, the quest of freedom itself as such. A man who belongs to some communist or revolutionary society wills certain concrete ends, which imply the will to freedom, but that freedom is willed in community. We will freedom for freedom’s sake, in and through particular circumstances. And in thus willing freedom, we discover that it depends entirely upon the freedom of others and that the freedom of others depends upon our own. Obviously, freedom as the definition of a man does not depend upon others, but as soon as there is a commitment, I am obliged to will the liberty of others at the same time as my own. I cannot make liberty my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim. Consequently, when I recognise, as entirely authentic, that man is a being whose existence precedes his essence, and that he is a free being who cannot, in any circumstances, but will his freedom, at the same time I realize that I cannot not will the freedom of others. Thus, in the name of that will to freedom which is implied in freedom itself, I can form judgments upon those who seek to hide from themselves the wholly voluntary nature of their existence and its complete freedom. Those who hide from this total freedom, in a guise of solemnity or with deterministic excuses, I shall call cowards. Others, who try to show that their existence is necessary, when it is merely an accident of the appearance of the human race on earth – I shall call scum. But neither cowards nor scum can be identified except upon the plane of strict authenticity. Thus, although the content of morality is variable, a certain form of this morality is universal. Kant declared that freedom is a will both to itself and to the freedom of others. Agreed: but he thinks that the formal and the universal suffice for the constitution of a morality. We think, on the contrary, that principles that are too abstract break down when we come to defining action. To take once again the case of that student; by what authority, in the name of what golden rule of morality, do you think he could have decided, in perfect peace of mind, either to abandon his mother or to remain with her? There are no means of judging. The content is always concrete, and therefore unpredictable; it has always to be invented. The one thing that counts, is to know whether the invention is made in the name of freedom.
  　　Let us, for example, examine the two following cases, and you will see how far they are similar in spite of their difference. Let us take The Mill on the Floss. We find here a certain young woman, Maggie Tulliver, who is an incarnation of the value of passion and is aware of it. She is in love with a young man, Stephen, who is engaged to another, an insignificant young woman. This Maggie Tulliver, instead of heedlessly seeking her own happiness, chooses in the name of human solidarity to sacrifice herself and to give up the man she loves. On the other hand, La Sanseverina in Stendhal’s Chartreuse de Parme, believing that it is passion which endows man with his real value, would have declared that a grand passion justifies its sacrifices, and must be preferred to the banality of such conjugal love as would unite Stephen to the little goose he was engaged to marry. It is the latter that she would have chosen to sacrifice in realising her own happiness, and, as Stendhal shows, she would also sacrifice herself upon the plane of passion if life made that demand upon her. Here we are facing two clearly opposed moralities; but I claim that they are equivalent, seeing that in both cases the overruling aim is freedom. You can imagine two attitudes exactly similar in effect, in that one girl might prefer, in resignation, to give up her lover while the other preferred, in fulfilment of sexual desire, to ignore the prior engagement of the man she loved; and, externally, these two cases might appear the same as the two we have just cited, while being in fact entirely different. The attitude of La Sanseverina is much nearer to that of Maggie Tulliver than to one of careless greed. Thus, you see, the second objection is at once true and false. One can choose anything, but only if it is upon the plane of free commitment.
  　　The third objection, stated by saying, “You take with one hand what you give with the other,” means, at bottom, “your values are not serious, since you choose them yourselves.” To that I can only say that I am very sorry that it should be so; but if I have excluded God the Father, there must be somebody to invent values. We have to take things as they are. And moreover, to say that we invent values means neither more nor less than this; that there is no sense in life a priori. Life is nothing until it is lived; but it is yours to make sense of, and the value of it is nothing else but the sense that you choose. Therefore, you can see that there is a possibility of creating a human community. I have been reproached for suggesting that existentialism is a form of humanism: people have said to me, “But you have written in your Nausée that the humanists are wrong, you have even ridiculed a certain type of humanism, why do you now go back upon that?” In reality, the word humanism has two very different meanings. One may understand by humanism a theory which upholds man as the end-in-itself and as the supreme value. Humanism in this sense appears, for instance, in Cocteau’s story Round the World in 80 Hours, in which one of the characters declares, because he is flying over mountains in an airplane, “Man is magnificent!” This signifies that although I personally have not built aeroplanes, I have the benefit of those particular inventions and that I personally, being a man, can consider myself responsible for, and honoured by, achievements that are peculiar to some men. It is to assume that we can ascribe value to man according to the most distinguished deeds of certain men. That kind of humanism is absurd, for only the dog or the horse would be in a position to pronounce a general judgment upon man and declare that he is magnificent, which they have never been such fools as to do – at least, not as far as I know. But neither is it admissible that a man should pronounce judgment upon Man. Existentialism dispenses with any judgment of this sort: an existentialist will never take man as the end, since man is still to be determined. And we have no right to believe that humanity is something to which we could set up a cult, after the manner of Auguste Comte. The cult of humanity ends in Comtian humanism, shut-in upon itself, and – this must be said – in Fascism. We do not want a humanism like that.
  　　But there is another sense of the word, of which the fundamental meaning is this: Man is all the time outside of himself: it is in projecting and losing himself beyond himself that he makes man to exist; and, on the other hand, it is by pursuing transcendent aims that he himself is able to exist. Since man is thus self-surpassing, and can grasp objects only in relation to his self-surpassing, he is himself the heart and center of his transcendence. There is no other universe except the human universe, the universe of human subjectivity. This relation of transcendence as constitutive of man (not in the sense that God is transcendent, but in the sense of self-surpassing) with subjectivity (in such a sense that man is not shut up in himself but forever present in a human universe) – it is this that we call existential humanism. This is humanism, because we remind man that there is no legislator but himself; that he himself, thus abandoned, must decide for himself; also because we show that it is not by turning back upon himself, but always by seeking, beyond himself, an aim which is one of liberation or of some particular realisation, that man can realize himself as truly human.
  　　You can see from these few reflections that nothing could be more unjust than the objections people raise against us. Existentialism is nothing else but an attempt to draw the full conclusions from a consistently atheistic position. Its intention is not in the least that of plunging men into despair. And if by despair one means as the Christians do – any attitude of unbelief, the despair of the existentialists is something different. Existentialism is not atheist in the sense that it would exhaust itself in demonstrations of the non-existence of God. It declares, rather, that even if God existed that would make no difference from its point of view. Not that we believe God does exist, but we think that the real problem is not that of His existence; what man needs is to find himself again and to understand that nothing can save him from himself, not even a valid proof of the existence of God. In this sense existentialism is optimistic. It is a doctrine of action, and it is only by self-deception, by confining their own despair with ours that Christians can describe us as without hope.
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  　　Further Reading: Simone De Beauvoir Archive | Marxism & Ethics | Ethics of Ambiguity, de Beauvoir 1947 | Marxist Humanism | Marxists Internet Archive
  　　Jean-Paul Sartre Archive | Value_of_Knowledge
  　　
•   　　前段時間有人聽說我過得好像還不錯，于是對我大加贊美，美其名曰：咸魚翻身。可我覺得咸魚就是咸魚，翻身了還是咸魚。不知道他是贊美還是挖苦，只好告訴自己，在咸魚圈可沒有你的位置，笑。細細品嚼斯賓諾莎的思想：“自由人最少想到死，他的智慧不是關於死的默念，而是對於生的沉思。”他的一生也徹底地實踐了這句格言，對死亡一直十分平靜面對。X在五年前對我說：“你知道薩特嗎？不，你不知道，直到你意識到你的存在。”X帶我走進了薩特的世界，存在主義讓我的思維和意識發生巨大的轉變。之后對于人生的思考便成了一種既具體又抽象的概念，存在主義曾一度將我帶向絕望的深淵，忽視了存在的意義，變得極端，導致對絕大多事產生厭惡，存在主義認為存在的過程，就是死亡的過程，從而認為‘存在’即‘不存在’的悲觀主義結論。直到X引導我由意識形態的邊緣拉回現實生活，而這種悲觀情緒已經深深刻入思維和意識。那到底什么是存在呢？存在主義既反應了對資本主義的反感和厭惡，又強調個人主義和主觀唯心主義，我不否認存在主義在‘自由’的框架下美化悲觀主義哲學，這種悲觀的處事態度會帶給我們更多的思考。
  　　
  　　等我們上完學，去找一份薪金微薄的工作，承擔一部分社會責任、義務，買車買房，我們相信等我們結了婚，有了孩子，生活會更美好。等有了孩子，又因為他們不夠大而煩惱，想等他們大些時，我們就會開心了。可等他們長大了，還是不行，於是又相信等他們再長大一些，幸福會來。之后我們的孩子便會做每個人一生總要做幾件事情，找工作、遇到他或者她、然后買一套稱之為家的房子。這時我們的人生已經立秋了，再過幾年就要退休了，這些束縛本身就是生活的障礙。而這些在我們生命里遭遇的各種幸與不幸，快樂與痛苦，淚水與掌聲，構成了我們的存在。
  　　
  　　存在主義以自我為中心，尊重他人的生活，崇尚個性自由。存在主義認為，個人價值高于一切，個人與社會永遠是分離對立的。倘若被某些事情羈絆，存在的本身就會變得毫無意義，尼采認為：生命中最強烈、最高的意志并不存在于只是要求生存下去的斗爭中，而是存在于斗爭的意識之中，存在于強力意志之中。在某些追求的過程中，不可避免地會掉入虛空，隨即失去價值。而薩特認為：‘他人即地獄’，在薩特看來，他人乃是一個客體存在，這種客體不同于物，他不但存在，而且對‘我’本身構成威脅，因為在他的相對中，我對他本身也是‘物’。我們的存在首先要出于自我存在，周圍的他人作為客體存在，若存在于他人客體的存在，即存在于自我存在的客體不存在；若存在于他人客體的不存在，則存在于自我不存在客體的存在。我相信這些存在主義理論會不斷完善并且作為追逐獨立意識自由而永遠延續下去，相信最近的東西和最遠的東西，相信不完全的真理，在十字路口找到救贖，相信存在和虛無。
  　　
  　　
  　　對于存在主義有興趣的各位我推薦存在主義相關及擴展閱讀著作：
  　　
  　　《存在于虛無》、《惡心》、《鼠疫》、《變形記》、《母豬女郎》。
  　　
  　　存在是一個旅程，而死亡是終點站。所以，
  　　
  　　去愛吧，就像不曾受過傷一樣；
  　　跳舞吧，像沒有人會欣賞一樣；
  　　唱歌吧，想沒有人會聆聽一樣；
  　　工作吧，像是不需要金錢一樣；
  　　生活吧，就像今天是末日一樣。
•   　　 认为这书通俗易懂的人估计是已经啃过了《存在与虚无》了。反正我觉得一上来就想通过这个小册子来了解萨特的思想绝对不是一条正路。书的前半部分《存在主义是一种人道主义》其实只占了81页中的26页，1946年的东西和后半部分1980年的访谈堆在一起，显然不是萨特的本意。不仅仅是因为萨特晚年想法的巨大转变，更因为后半部分的访谈，看起来仅仅是纠缠于一些细枝末节的概念和萨特所或参与或经历或研究过的种种实实在在的社会现实，而且往往是想到哪儿说到哪儿，没什么条理。甚至莱维在很多时候都呈现出比萨特强烈得多的谈话欲望，这让这个访谈多少有点儿奇怪。
  　　 另外我想说的是，萨特说的“人道主义”总让我觉得和我们平时理解中的人道主义是两码事，存在主义不把人当成手段甚至不把人当成目的这一特点并不能用我们平时理解的人道主义来概括，用“人本主义”可能更贴切。我想这可能是翻译或是中西文化差异造成的误会，正如翻译所说，所谓的“负责”的原意可能更接近“表态”。
  　　 最后，从两篇序言可以看到两位译者对萨特的感情有着鲜明的差异。前者冷静得出奇（也因此有了装逼的嫌疑），后者周煦良却对萨特饱含赞美之情。两相比较，颇值得玩味。
  　　
•   　　这些天又仿佛到了丧失叙述能力的时候了。断续地看了写书，也懒得写书评，其实哪是书评，不过是些细屑的杂侃。但这种心情也消却了。生活还算美好，总是能遇上些不错的朋友，然而那些离别的愁绪总是在相聚时便开始酝酿。思想飘忽不定，反复沉浮，呈现一种游离状。我乐意将它当成是青春的原貌。虽然这种说法有点矫情。
  　　
  　　前几天看了萨特的《存在主义是一种人道主义》，觉得这是可以装逼的一本书，便暗暗决定一定要多少写点什么。其实这不过是篇比较短的论文，用词通俗明了，才有兴致一直读完。萨特是我很推崇的一个哲学家，他的观点我相当欣赏，虽说他坚持无神论，而我是泛神论者，但说到底也没什么区别。福柯曾说，这世界上可能没有哲学，只有哲学家。但萨特的哲学观基本能使我欣然接受，大抵是它契合了这个时代、社会以及个人思想诸如此类的东西。
  　　
  　　因为叙述的乏力，所以只好概括下他的观点。存在主义的核心思想，就在于自由承担责任的绝对性质。人在存在主义者眼中是不能下定义的，因为在一开头人是什么都说不上。他所以说得上是往后的事，那时候他就会是他认为的那种人了。人性是没有的，因为没有上帝提供一个人的概念。人除了自己认为并愿意成为的那样之外，什么都不是。这就是存在主义的第一原则。人只是在企图成为什么时才取得存在。我们找不到任何为自己辩解或者推卸责任的方法。我们只是孤零零一个人，无法自解。由是，人们必须为之承担责任，而且不仅仅是对自己的个性负责，还得对所有人负责。
  　　
  　　在阅读中，不时有醍醐灌顶豁然开朗的感觉。你决定成为什么样的人，你在别人眼中是什么样的人，都要看你的行动，而你的行动是由你自己的意愿决定，而不是受天性所限。虽说基因对性格或许的确有一定影响，但后天因素显然更重要。哎，在许多人眼中，我都是一副好学生乖乖女的模样。虽然我经常旷掉不喜欢的课，在考试的时候还故意挑试卷的刺，有时还会做些常人匪夷所思的事。我自然不以为自己是好学生，但似乎也不够叛逆。我的思想有时可以很激进，但行动上总感觉被什么东西牵绊着。有时真感觉自己什么都不是，什么也做不好，没有一件可以引以为豪达到极致的东西，心中还总为那些该做却没做的事情后悔着。他人的批评，即便是隐藏的不满，都成为道道疤痕烙在我的心上。为此，可以低落许久。也许，还是因为自己完美主义吧。何必活得这么累。享受当下就好了。
•   　　 要评价一个人，追溯其所处环境及动机是必要的。环境即为限制，而动机说明了一个人曾想要成为一个什么样的人。〔萨特说：“任何一个人类意图都表现为企图超过这些限制，或者扩大这些限制，不然就是否定这些限制，或者使自己适应这些限制。”）
  　　 因为有了这样的梳理，任何一个人的结果都可以被理解了，同时没有任何一个结果会不可理解。但理解归理解，评价一个人却是要依着结果，让那人为这结果负责。既然最终还是依着结果来评价一个人，之前的那些梳理又有何用呢？
  　　 首先，对于除己之外的人。由于是可追溯的，便有助于我们了解在结果之前是如何环环相扣，也就可以像亚里士多德所讲，借此引起恐惧——也就是在梳理的过程中，让自己仿佛躬亲了一次，以作借鉴。
  　　 其次，对于自己。因为了解到评价终归是一件事后的事，所以在每一次行动之前，都要想清楚周遭的环境如何，自己到底想成为什么样的人、到底如何选择（注意：不选择也是种选择）。
  　　 总之，人会，而且要，为自己的行动负责。因为要负责，所以在行动之前审慎考量。因为要负责、要审慎考量，所以会负责。
  　　
  　　
•   　　 这大概是讲存在主义最好懂的一本书。虽然远不是终点，却提供了一个可供参考的起点。五年前，我曾把这篇访谈的梗概梳理了一下，希望也能成为接近这本书的起点。
  　　 人的“存在先于本质”，这是萨特提出的第一个命题。萨特举例说 ，裁纸刀的存在，是因为首先在工匠的头脑中有一个裁纸刀的本质，对裁纸刀这样的物来说，本质先于存在。如果说上帝脑中先有人的本质，然后才造出了人，那我们当然可以说对人而言，也是本质先于存在。这也是有神论的一贯看法。但是如果人先有本质，后有存在，那么人可能拥有的自由就很有限了。因为本质不是由人决定，而人的存在必须服从本质。从自由的角度出发，存在主义自然而然的提出了“存在先于本质”这一第一原则。需要说明的是，人存在本身是不自由的。英文中出生是“be born”，用的是被动语态，也就是说人没有选择是否出生，是否开始存在的自由。但当人已经存在的时候，人就有了选择的自由（不过人没有不选择的自由, 因为不选择本身就是一种选择）。萨特认为，当人做出自由选择时，人的本质就在选择中得到了体现。正因为这种选择是自由，“人就要对自己是怎样的人负责”。但是这种责任是沉重的，人不仅仅要对“自己的个性负责”， 还要对“所有的人负责”。因为“一个人应当永远扪心自问，如果人人都照你这样做，那将是什么情形。”这种道德判定模式，显然是受康德的影响。但萨特不是那个先将上帝杀死，然后又让上帝复活的康德，他指出了这种为所有人负责的痛苦。因为没有上帝，因为人的本质是由人自己决定的。我们无法说一种行动比另一个行动更好。人是自由，但同时也是孤零零的。没有任何一种价值体系可以用来参照。萨特举了一个例子，说一个士兵面临是抚养母亲还是上前线保卫祖国的两难选择。不论哪一种选择，在萨特看来都是可以的，都是道德的。但我们也可以换一个角度说，不论哪一种选择，都是不道德的。这正是人生的绝望处境。对于这种绝望，萨特的回答是“我们应当不怀着希望行动。”
  　　 萨特认为他的哲学是一种“严峻的乐观主义”，严峻来自承担责任的痛苦，乐观因为人的自由。
  　　
  　　 2004年3月16日
•   　　鄙人实践发现存在主义利用好了能给人以轻松洒脱和斗志昂扬的感觉，在此把存在主义的主要观点和自己的认识糅合在了一起，思维狭隘暂且罗列这么多。望更多人能“存在一点，胜人一筹”。
  　　
  　　-----
  　　1.存在先于本质：
  　　
  　　“不是其所是，是其所不是。”在行动未投向未来之前，你什么都不是，当然，你也可以什么都是。
  　　
  　　你的意义被投向未来，你的人生将超越理性：过去不可解释，未来不可预测，但是眼前的这一刻，却是具体的、可以把握的。
  　　
  　　别人说你成不了大器，或许是因为他还未成为其想要成为的大器。除了你自己之外，别让别人决定你将会是什么。
  　　
  　　-----
  　　2.自由意志的选择：
  　　
  　　“没有懦弱的心、肺或者大脑，懦弱也并非天生，一个人之所以懦弱，是因为他通过自己的行动成为了一个懦夫，世界上没有懦弱的气质这样东西，懦弱是一个人后天为其行动负责后的结果，是其自由意志的选择。”
  　　
  　　在你没死之前，不要说“我爱你爱到可以为你去死”，请用行动证明你的情感，因为“离开爱的行动是没有爱的”。
  　　
  　　如果为某事、某人甚至自己感到恶心，那么恭喜你，你还没有麻木，你还有自由需要开辟。
  　　
  　　自由永远是一项重罪，没有全然无谓的自由。有人选择了它，却被判刑；有人逃避了，却成就了他人的自由。
  　　
  　　所有的快乐不过一瞬、所有的悲伤都斗不过流年。一切都会过去，甚至是爱。追求只是在加速失去。
  　　
  　　有时候，放弃意味着自由。
  　　
  　　-----
  　　3.荒谬的世界：
  　　
  　　“存在的过程，就是死亡的过程。”
  　　
  　　你永远不知道将来有什么在等着你，你的未来，永远是一片有待填补的空白。
  　　
  　　既然不知将得到何物，也就无所谓失去，面对未来种种巧合和意外，面对人性难以预知的责难，静候，将是最好的选择。
  　　
  　　丑陋、贪婪和自私深藏在人的内心，有的心知肚明，有得浑然不知，有得矢口否认。人的价值，总会在面对诱惑的一瞬间被决定。
  　　
  　　每个人都在选择自由，每个人都在为自己而活，你我彼此彼此，何必伪装，何必借口；何必抱怨，何必强求？
  　　
  　　所谓文明源自对人类本性的压抑，原始的私念、欲念被迫变相的释放，我们的文明受伤了，而且将会伤的越来越重。
  　　
  　　-----
  　　4.他人就是地狱：
  　　
  　　如果你和你的恋人痛苦的在一起只是因为别人习惯看到你们这样，最后你也会习惯于这样去看别人。
  　　
  　　你以为穿着一身名牌别人就会对你另眼相待，其实，他们更在乎今天晚上去哪家餐厅吃饭。
  　　
  　　“一旦自由在一个人的灵魂里爆发了，申明（身份认同）对这个人也无能为力了。”
  　　
  　　在你未了解自己之前，你永远只能通过别人的眼睛来看待自己。关键是，人永远不可能了解自己，我们也就永远只能活在别人的评价之中。
  　　
  　　如果你想做成一件事，就必须要做一百件你不想做的事。
  　　
  　　这是个人人都必经的地狱，你可以选择摆脱，但在此之前，你必须学会走出自己的世界，学会和无关的人相处。经历这个地狱，是为了能让你从容的走进天堂。
  　　
  　　-----
  　　5.责任与道义：
  　　
  　　你既然选择要成为你，就必须为令你成为你的行动负责。
  　　
  　　这个世界不是所有可能存在的世界中最好的一个，你我都有责任。
•   　　存在感於意識中是你感覺自己存在的存在和他人存在於客體的不存在。若存在於他人客體的存在，即存在於自己存在的客體的不存在，若存在於他人客體的不存在，即存在於自己不存在的客體存在。
  　　
  　　看起來很重要，又好像不是，人不過是宇宙中的一粒微塵。既然還活著，就讓自己快樂些，別被那些無聊的人和事牽絆，我們沒有必要刻意在意別人的看法和觀點，當你意識到自己的主體存在，也就認清了他人的客體存在，而不必把自己當作客體存在，一切應是為你而轉而變的，你就是你的宇宙，因為你和我一樣，都會死很久。
  　　
  　　別太把自己當人，更別把自己當個人物似的，拜托，看在上帝的份兒上。
•   　　中午偶看电视，新闻频道每周日十二点半播每周质检报告，显然食品质量问题已播不胜播，在中国这样一造假大国，质检的片子永远不会倒闭，今天的主题是生活质量，以及全民运动状况，质检结果就俩字儿：不足。中国人的文化里就是缺啥补啥，不足就要补足，接着就是各大专家教授学者权威一一露面，各显摆活，苦口婆心连哄带吓，告诉全国人民，你们要赶快运动啊，再不运动就要像柴铃说的那样这个国家要亡了这个民族要完了，专家们把运动器材店老板想说而没能力说的全给说了。
  　　
  　　
  　　我对这期节目只有一个想法，中国人太好为人师了，又太自以为聪明了，这个问题不能深解，只能意会，归根到底还是文化属性问题，而对于浸泡在这个社会里的人来说，又是文化如来不容思议，大家看到想到，一切理所当然。文化层面不是短期能解决的，冰冻三尺非一日之寒，三尺之冰非一朝可溶，何况沉积了两千多年的文化。中国缺的从来不是人，死掉十亿，还比美国加日本多，还是超级大国。中国不怕死人，怕不死人。就像敖博说的，多杀几个没问题，多死几个当放屁。
  　　
  　　
  　　中国历来深陷愚昧的封建文化中不可自拔，都是文化惹的祸。放眼前两百年，群体愚昧的一塌糊涂，素质低得无以复低，而自以为是好为人师甚至好为人导师的个体却层出不穷。林则徐要救中国，曾国藩要保国家，紧接着洪秀全孙中山汪精卫秋瑾陈独秀林昭张志新，甚至白白嫩嫩的柴铃都要救中国，都要当总指挥，翻看中国近现代史，你会看到无数自以为是自以为师的人。
  　　
  　　
  　　中国不是因为没救才没救，而是因为有了这么多想救它的人而没救。中国真的不需要救，这个国家这个民族怎么折腾也亡不了，只要那些喜欢当总指挥的人不带头折腾就好。中国人需要的是好好赚钱，自由竞争，多为社会积累财富，而不是什么锻炼身体。中国需要优化国民素质，需要贫富差距，要大乱，求大治。三十多年没乱了，也该乱乱了。多死一批人没关系，中国不需要人道主义。中国需要时间。
•   　　后一篇谈话完全没读懂，我的基础太差之故。
  　　前一篇基本能明白。再次感觉到哲学的不确定和自由。存在主义可以被人指责悲观，但萨特也可以找理由说其实质乐观，各说各有理。所以我们更得有自己的判断力了。
•   　　我思固我在.
  　　我们在中国式唯物主义里浸淫久了,正常的哲学思考会受限制.而唯心的一些理论也很难接受.作为唯心一面的存在主义,是唯心论里最精彩,最有思考学习价值的思想.应该多读,多看,多想.
  　　其实存在主义,也只是一种思想,它本身也有很多不同的主张,不同人可以有不同的理解,
  　　
  　　思想不应该像共产党的教条,框起来,不准动!
  　　思想是应该多面的,积极的思考.
•   　　因为你行动，所以你是你
  　　 ------谈《存在主义是一种人道主义》
  　　
  　　 你是否意识到自我的存在？
  　　 当然，这一问题对于大多数人来说是不存在的。我是某某，我是学生，我是某某的儿女。可是在萨特看来，一旦你把自己说成为某一客观的东西，那你自己的异化就开始了。“他人即地狱”，社会关系成了你自我异化的根源。倘若你觉得自己是存在的，那你只能算得上“自在”的存在。难道你只能是某一社会关系的指称吗？若是这样，那你自己已被归结为由他人限定的一种既定的社会角色。而你自己只把自己当作这一对象化的客体，那你不是在“自欺欺人”吗？
  　　 可你究竟是谁？
  　　 你就是你，其他的什么也不是。你唯有保持自我的主体性，站在对象之外通过自由地选择，对自己的对象虚无化、否定，把这一对象化从它的混沌一团的自在背景中呈现出来。这时你才具有超越对象的能力，而这种能力也就是人所独具的。萨特就会对你说，你现在是“自为”的存在着了。你的存在总是先于你的本质。你唯有通过你的选择，你的行动才能表现出你的本质。你不应让自己陷入某一社会关系中，不应让自己为某种思想所左右，包括你现在正在接触的存在主义。先前的你是荒诞的、偶然的存在，对自身之外的整个存在是一种混沌的、未分化的体验，可现在你自觉了，有意识了。
  　　可你又该如何选择？
  　　 你的选择会是顺其自然，随波逐流的吗？如果是，那你依然“不存在”。也许你会问，“当我在用自己的价值观和性格来决定我的选择以突显我的主体性时，我的价值观和性格不也已经受到环境的影响了吗？”一个婴儿刚他开始啼哭的时候，他已经意识到了自我的存在，而这样的存在要比所谓的“理性”的存在更符合“自为”的存在。当你在思考并做出选择之前，你是否意识到自己需要思考思考本身呢？为什么？婴儿的认知比你现在更原初。当你在反思之时，你是否要进行“反思之前的我思”呢？存在主义者会告诉你，是的，你需要。唯有清除一切现成的观念，你才能真正站在对象之外进行自由的选择。这时你的选择才是主动的，自为的，有意识的。
  　　 你的一切就是你的行动给予的。而我们是由我们自己所造就的。当我们明白了我们自己的本来面目之后，我们选择的行动就要担负起我们成为我们自己的责任。把全人类的命运交付到人类自己的手上。我们不仅要为自己做出选择，也为全人类做出了选择。这或许是示范的作用，也可称之为这种示范所带来的扩散的影响。在人们的眼里，众人的选择都是择优的，因而在他们的心里就有了暗示。你的选择似乎在告诉着他人，“人就应该如此。”你铸就了自己，也铸就了人。
  　　 存在主义是否是一种对人生采取无所作为的绝望态度的观望哲学？不。“从事一件事情而不存在什么希望。”你把私念全都掏空，只留下一种精神，一种只成为你自己的精神，这样你才能宁静致远。那生命的意义何在？我想，应该是生生不息。人生的意义就在于挖掘出蕴含于自己体内的潜质，只有这些潜质才能让你成为你自己。人就在于其特殊性，所有的人都应该努力地表现自己与众不同的特殊个性。那我们又该如何让潜质成就我们自己？赋予选择以行动吧。潜质是存在于我们的体内，但你不给予它表现的话它就是不存在的。我们何必去羡慕一个人的天才，而那天才又是没有被表现出来的呢？唯有实际行动是可靠的，所谓的希望就是那遥不可及的烛光。这是悲观吗？不。倘若说悲观主义要比乐观主义更深刻的话，那只是因为所说的乐观是盲目的而已。而一种谨慎的乐观难道不能给予人以信心吗？存在主义就如此。可这会因为提倡个人的主体性而蔑视任何社会组织吗？不。因为人必须作出道德选择才能成为他自己，而这是环境给他的压力。人的选择必须是能够承担其行动责任的选择，如此便可以把别人的自由当作自己的自由来追求。我们就可以在高呼发现自我的同时依然存在于这个社会。给予人自为的意识，教人谨慎而乐观地行动，存在主义成为了人道主义。
  　　 在这个物质至上、崇尚标准化的时代，你是否已感受到自己有机械化的倾向。假如我们把人看作是那完整的人、那奥林匹亚山下的健身者，那你是否会发现自己只是处在一个动物到人的过渡地带？假如应试的标准屏蔽了你的人性，横流的物欲激发了你的兽性，那你又何曾存在？发现自己吧，然后行动。
  　　
•   　　 一般这类哲学书籍，我选择在入睡前阅读，可以帮助睡眠。不过这本并不是那么难懂，所以差点没睡着！
  　　 让.保罗.萨特是存在主义的代表人物，他写这本书，给自己和他的存在主义树了一块碑，告诉基督教徒和信仰马克思主义的共产党，它是如何不同于它们。作为在法国兴起的一种新的哲学诠释，难免受到当道派别的拉拢和讽刺。独树一帜就是这本书想要达到的目的。
  　　 存在主义认为，人选择成为自己想成为的类型的人。同时为这种选择对自己和他人负责。 证明这个独树一帜的见解，萨特也避免不了谈论到自由，情感，人性等纠缠千年的问题，他不停的和海德格尔和上帝的理论做比较，目的在于批驳对存在主义的三项误解和批评。其一，存在主义被批评为主观主义。其二，并不是人人的选择都一样。其三，人的选择并不会存在实际的意义。他认为存在主义是一种人道主义。
  　　 这样的论证很有启发意义，不奇怪它能在美国风行并且影响至今。他所指出的人道主义指的是人始终处在自身之外，人靠把自己投出去并消失在自身之外而使人存在；人是靠追求超越的目的才得以存在。既然人是这样超越自己，而且只在超越自己这方面掌握客体，他本身就是他超越的中心。这种构成人的超越性（不是如超越上帝，而是超越自己）和主观性（人不是关闭在自身以内，而是处在人的宇宙）的关系。
  　　 有人说，社会是你想象的那样。其实不然，社会是我们努力的那样，超越自己，就能得到更超越的社会。
  　　 本书后半部分是萨特接受采访的记录，关于他各个分论点和论据的进一步解释。可以慢慢等想不通的时候查阅。
  　　
•   嗯就是。你说得对。我还是这个样子觉得的
•   嗯，共鸣？一致？思想碰撞出的火花？
  我想抠个鼻子·········
•   光“听任”这段就很有问题 萨特什么时候鼓励人遇到问题求助“道德标杆”了？他鼓励人遵从自己的内心自由选择
•   看到那里“人也越不出人的主观性”，存在主义似乎一下子变成了道德哲学，囧死死死死囧我了
  ==============
  不过这种转型似乎也是合情合理的，想想歌德是一位多么有德行的人啊
•   恩，梳理得很清晰
•   请重新分析一遍，
•   思路很清楚，明白一点
•   很好，有多明白了一点。。。原文还是挺晦涩的，不能完全理解。。。
•   不完全呢，你只是分析了这篇文章的开头部分。后面还有三个问题，以及三个回答，这让我很困惑。他要论述的是存在主义我懂，可是原文里的答案不是很明了，求赐教~~
•   很多人执着于萨特说的为自己的自由负责，其实这个可以简单地理解为承受自己自由选择的后果，只是一个简单推理罢了。萨特之所以特意提出来正是体现了人道主义的一面——纯自由是人类社会化的天敌，这个问题本该在社会学中提出，而不是基础哲学里。
•   请问一下您是怎样理解“存在先于本质”的呢？谢谢！！！
•   剪刀的本质是什么？剪东西吗
•   这本书我看了前20页就是你写的这些内容，后面都没必要看是吗
•   其实大家也可以去看一看英文原版的，句子不难，内容需要自己细细的想一下就可以了。。。。
•   LZ是把基督教的存在主义和无神论的存在主义搞混了来解释的吧，在这本书中，作者是无神论的存在主义者。剪刀的例子，是基督教的存在主义关于本质先于存在的解读。用这个来解释无神论的存在主义，走远了你。
•   不错。我虽然也看过这本书，但没有写出这么多的总结
•   写着玩的，只是给自己个提醒，我心理问题挺严重的。呵呵。
•   我曾有一段时间能够静下来看书，那时发现，
  把看过的内容总结下来，能够更好的帮助理解。
•   这个问题已经困扰我很久了，我看书看着看着思绪就飘了，人是静了，脑子却静不下来。而且我做事一直不分缓急，该看的书不看，不该看的瞎看。要是看着看着突然想做啥事了，就又会立马急着想去做，无论多大点事儿。呵呵。
•   有没有试过：把想到的事情记下来到一个地方，然后看看重要程度和紧急程度排一个时间，然后继续手头的事情？
  有一本书分析这个问题很不错，叫做《高效能人士的 七个习惯》，虽然是一本畅销励志书，但是在这个问题上有些有趣的见识
•   嗯，这书听说过，回头去看看，谢谢啦。
•   “所谓文明源自对人类本性的压抑，原始的私念、欲念被迫变相的释放，我们的文明受伤了，而且将会伤的越来越重。 ”
  看得出你对弗洛伊德有相当程度的了解，可是弗洛伊德的理论也有他的局限性。我认为一个人对人性的理解构成了此人价值观的最核心部分，这个问题相当重要，丝毫含糊不得。按照精神分析社会文化学派对不同文化下的人性的研究，所谓人的本性其实相当程度的依赖于人所处的社会文化环境的。推荐你去了解下弗洛姆的《为自己的人》《人类的破坏性剖析》。每个人都有他自己的心理问题的，只是很多人都把这事压抑了。非常不幸我压抑失败了。
  哦。对了。萨特那本《存在与虚无》你看懂了么？
  郁闷啊，我看不懂啊。要理解存在主义，似乎要先熟悉现象学，要熟悉现象学，似乎要先了解康德，要了解康德，似乎先要... 到头来就回到了泰勒斯啦！
•   弗洛伊德就非常重视童年时期的经历，回头想想真的性格、处世态度和方式，都是从那会儿就养成了，人想要刻意的改变自己，与这种性格抗争，到头来还是败给了自己。
  萨特也有点这个意思，他觉得环境在压制人的选择，也就是压制人成为自己想成为的那个人。。。所以这可能也是这种抗争会失败会被无视的原因了。。。有时候人必须顺应社会，顺应自然，把某些自由的权利交给国家，国家才能给你诸如安全等权利。。。换到人身上，也是如此，就是要顺应那个最真实的自己。。。
  说实话萨特那个《存在与虚无》我没看懂，因为经常看一会儿就晕了。就一直处于“想看”的状态，有人评论说我未看先评不负责任，我也认了。毕竟是真没看懂。
  要看懂的话，了解其他哲学流派是必须的，很明显存在主义里有精神分析、怀疑论、经验主义的感觉。。。要真正追溯的话，估计就只能追溯到苏格拉底了。。。呵呵。哲学我不是很懂的，而且逻辑思维不够，我看不懂是正常的。。。
  其实最重要的，还是自己去感受生活，去观察人际关系。这个是直接的体验，真理不是文字本身，有时是无法间接体验的。真理也不能被赞同，只有明白与不明白。。。
  废话多了。。。见谅。。最近想的也比较多。哎。挺折腾的。
•   反正我觉得那些我们以为是自由的选择，是完全出于个人意愿的选择，其实也没有摆脱环境的干系，里面肯定夹杂了环境里的是非观念、道义规则，不管我们承不承认，从出生起无论是被动的还是主动的选择，都有环境背景潜移默化的影响。。。
  所以最好的方法，就是不去刻意追求自由，让自由自由的光顾，不然就会出现用正确的思想，做错误的事这种情况。。。
  谢谢您的推荐，弗洛姆的书我回头去看，但不是现在，我已经走火入魔了，头痛失眠有一阵时间了，我几乎是放弃了考研在寻求解脱之道，后来才发觉，刻意寻求解脱就永远无法解脱。。等我有能力做到不带任何目的、理想、观念去全然投入一件事的时候，再看吧，不然又要头疼了。。。呵呵
•   ...
  你觉得你面临着一个怎样的问题？
•   说来话长。。。
  http://www.douban.com/review/2920630/
•   自由是不会自己跑过来跳到你的口袋的。自由绝对是对人努力的一个奖赏。
  不过我看你似乎需要相当长的一段休息的时间...
  good luck！
•   嗯，呵呵，谢谢，我昨天没看任何书，第一次全神贯注去观察周围的生活，好多了，头一遭睡满6小时。呵呵。
•   不同的体系如果发生冲突的话，是需要耐心去理顺的，要不然真的会精神分裂。所以一定要注意循序渐进，把毛料编顺当，一脚一脚的将它们踩在脚下。
•   嗯，真好，谢谢你~
•   哲学书籍，不管是存在主义还是虚无主义，都不会增加你的存在感，相反会减少你的存在感。
  因为哲学的高度概括性和总结性，概念性的东西一定比实体性的多的多 。找到百度知道这个答案不错，真觉得找不到自己的存在感，扇自己几耳光就知道了。前提是不要故意自我麻痹
•   存在主义里是不存在精神分析成份的，存在主义与弗洛伊德理论有天然不可共存的成份。
•   看 吉尔伯茶和dawn的对话（包括http://book.douban.com/review/2920630/里面的），感觉很有意思啊，3年以后了，不知道你们现在又处于一种什么样的状况？
  同样的这些问题，每代人都在经历啊。
  我也比较认可存在主义的哲学（其实只是听别人说起，然后看了一点点萨特的书），关于弗洛伊德的那个理论，我也是受益匪浅，慢慢回想自己的童年，发现自己现在的种种状况就大都可以理解了，也无需，或者说很难以至于不该去改变，顺从这么多年形成的习惯，依据这特质去选择，也可以很好。
•   晕了。。。
•   我的天啊，不要告诉我萨特整本书，18块呢，都在这么绕~~~~~~
  那我花18块买了书，还要花81块找到回来的路！！
•   不是 這是我的個人看法。。。
•   　中国不是因为没救才没救，而是因为有了这么多想救它的人而没救。
  顶你，呵呵
•   折腾乃生命之本。咯儿屁了就不用折腾了。
  你愿意折腾什么大乱杀人，借此优化国民素质增大贫富差距竞争累积财富之类乱七八糟是其实是没问题的。什么时候你咯屁了也不用折腾了。
  人家没死也想折腾着锻炼身体追求人道其实也是没问题的，咯屁了还是就不闹腾了。
  你需要时间。你更需要人道主义。
•   这本书不太适合你，你应该看《我的奋斗》。
•   LS正解。
•   无知啊~我思固我在是存在主义吗????
•   倘若说悲观主义要比乐观主义更深刻的话，那只是因为所说的乐观是盲目的而已。而一种谨慎的乐观难道不能给予人以信心吗？存在主义就如此。
•   乐平的课？
•   发现自己，然后行动
•   不盲目行动，有自由意识的行动，你才是你，还要点智慧。
•   请问LZ学的是什么专业那个大学啊？我高三毕业后也想写这样的作业= =
•   行动创造世界